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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Volkswagen emissions scandal of September 2015 is one of the biggest corporate 
frauds in the 21st Century. The wrongdoings of the Volkswagen Group1 (also interchange-
ably referred to as VW) were exposed over three years ago, but all the details of the scan-
dal and its consequences are still not entirely covered (McGee 2018b). Volkswagen group 
with its subsidiaries was at the time of the scandal’s outbreak the largest automobile pro-
ducer in the world. It was a company with longstanding traditions and the hallmark of 
“Made in Germany” quality brands. This makes it an interesting and relevant subject for 
research.  
1.1 Background of the study 
As multinational enterprises have stretched their operations from one continent to another 
and the significance of the nationality of a global firm is fading, the relationship between 
the firm and its surrounding society is also changing. In this time of fast-paced commu-
nication, an analysis on Volkswagen’s reaction to the outbreak of the emissions scandal 
provides new knowledge on crisis management of multinational enterprises faced by both 
local and global crisis. This also suggest further points of interest, as other car manufac-
turers have been found guilty of comparable illegal behaviour since the investigations on 
Volkswagen’s diesel engines started in USA in 2015 (Mehrotra & Welch 2017). Ongoing 
investigations and research will tell, if tricking emissions testing results are a widespread 
phenomenon in the car manufacturing industry among large multinational legacy car 
manufacturers. Volkswagen’s scandal might then be the first in a row of scandals, inves-
tigations and verdicts. Thus, gathering information and conducting research on corporate 
crisis management in the wake of a possible major crisis in the industry is of outmost 
importance. 
To be able to properly analyse Volkswagen’s emissions scandal one must look at the 
scope of its business and the deeds of the company. From 2010 onward Volkswagen had 
started a push to become the biggest car manufacturer in the world. In July 2015, imme-
diately before the scandal, Volkswagen took over its nearest competitor Toyota to become 
number one in the world. (Cremer & Funakoshi 2015.) It produced around 10 Million 
cars annually (World Ranking of Manufacturers 2015) and strived for further growth with 
                                                 
1 Volkswagen AG or Volkswagen Group (eng.) not only owns the marque Volkswagen but also a lot of 
other passenger car marques as Audi, Seat, Skoda, Bugatti, Bentley, Porsche, Lamborghini etc. For the 
purpose of this study there is no need to separate between the marques and brands, as most Volkswagen 
owned marques share the same engines and production facilities with each other. Therefore, Volkswagen 
or VW will be used to describe the parental company Volkswagen Group and all its ownings, including the 
different car brands. (Volkswagen AG 2019) 
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a strategy of “clean diesel”, until the American regulators caught the manufacturer for 
having installed defeat devices in its cars in September 2015 (Hakim et al. 2015).  
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal is just one data point in a long row of corporate scan-
dals during the modern era of our industrialised world. Some major scandals have had 
long-term consequences for the wrong-doer, as the famous Enron scandal, which led to 
the demise of the whole enterprise (Segal 2018), whereas others have survived their scan-
dals with lesser effects. What are the reasons for this, and can companies impact their 
survival in crises?  
One explanation might be the success of the immediate actions of the firm when faced 
with a large-scale crisis. Immediate reactions of firms that fall into self-inducted reputa-
tional crisis often include different sorts of crisis management actions. A prominent and 
important part of crisis management is crisis communication, which starts directly in the 
beginning of the crisis (Massey 2001). Such was also the case with Volkswagen in Sep-
tember 2015. As a large multinational firm, it is evident, that Volkswagen had a plan for 
crisis management before the start of the crisis, even though it wouldn’t have been ready 
for this particular scandal. Regardless the intent for which the crisis management plan 
was written it came to use in the aftermath of the scandal. 
In the course of writing of this thesis, over three years had passed after the outburst of 
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal. The scandal has since 2015 matured and the first ver-
dicts on the illegalities of Volkswagen has been given. Even though long-time conse-
quences are still to be seen, the first reactions to the scandal can already be evaluated. The 
interesting aspect, from a crisis management perspective, is the question on how well 
Volkswagen handled the crisis. The effectiveness of a firm’s crisis management can be 
evaluated in many ways. If the success of Volkswagen’s crisis management is analysed 
through its revenues or sold cars, then the defensive actions set up by Volkswagen have 
definitely been a success for the company. The firm managed to again climb to the num-
ber one position among car manufacturers in 2016, just one year after the crisis (BBC 
News 2017). It has also achieved material economic success with excellent results with 
rising revenues and operating profits after the crisis. (McGee 2018a). This sounds coun-
terintuitive after such a heavy reputational burden that Volkswagen has had to carry since 
2015. What is the reason behind Volkswagen regaining its position so quickly? 
1.2 Research objectives 
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal is as multifaceted as it is enduring. The German car 
manufacturer is at the moment in a very special situation due to the crisis and thus all new 
research about the scandal would broaden the understanding of what really happened with 
and within the company after the crisis. It can be analysed in various ways, for example 
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as an amplifier for financial downturn for the German economy (Georgeevski & AlQudah 
2016), as an ethical question of the role of a corporation in a society (Rhodes 2016), as 
an analysis of the death toll of the vehicles’ excess emissions (Holland et al. 2016) or as 
a corporate governance case (Crete 2016). A description on Volkswagen’s emissions 
scandal is presented in chapter 2.  
However, my interest to this scandal originates in the contrast between the clear mis-
conduct and the economically very successful recovery of VW. This combination made 
me ponder how firms can redeem their illicit deeds or ask for forgiveness. One straight-
forward explanation could for example be to wait for a court ruling, and accept the case 
solved after the guilty has served its sentence or alternatively paid its fines. This solution 
does not fit Volkswagen’s scandal that well, since the first judiciary verdict came over 
one and a half years after discovery of the fraud (McGee 2017) and firm and all its stake-
holders had not waited in a limbo for the court’s decision. Thus, it can be concluded that 
a reconciliation with stakeholders such as customers and VW is not something that is 
dictated from a courtroom, but rather something that originates from stakeholder interac-
tion.  
I have chosen to study VW’s crisis management during the crisis and to find out how 
it may have affected the company’s success for the better. For this purpose, I have used 
Mark Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy management framework as the lenses through which 
VW’s actions to repair its legitimacy are analysed. Legitimacy management is seen as a 
theory-based method for crisis management and thus the concepts of legitimacy manage-
ment and crisis management will be used interchangeably in this thesis. Suchman’s legit-
imacy management framework originates in legitimacy theory where it is defined as an 
organisation’s pursuit of justification and acceptance for its existence. Legitimacy man-
agement and the action proposals it gives for repairing a firm’s legitimacy will be defined 
in the review of academic literature on legitimacy theory in chapter 3.  
I will analyse Volkswagen’s press releases in the immediate aftermath of the scandal. 
These press releases are a part of VW’s crisis communication after the emissions scandal 
and a key tool in the firm’s crisis management. As the crisis communication is analysed 
through the lenses of legitimacy management it is seen to describe the firm’s legitimacy 
repairing actions and communication of these actions. The research is conducted as a desk 
research on press releases and no actual field research of Volkswagen’s crisis manage-
ment (at production facilities etc.) is conducted. However, Volkswagen’s strategic actions 
and choices for its legitimacy management are described in the firm’s communication.   
The aim of this thesis is to find out, present, and analyse the various ways in which 
VW tried to repair its legitimacy, based on the press releases VW released after the scan-
dal and the formulated research questions is: “How did Volkswagen try to repair its legit-
imacy after the emissions scandal through crisis communication?”. The analysis of press 
releases gives a deeper understanding on how the firm reacted to the scandal and how and 
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what it communicated after the outbreak of the scandal. The study is a qualitative research 
where systematic content analysis is used as the method of analysis. These methodologi-
cal choices for the research are found in chapter 4. The classification process for the con-
tent analysis and the categories of legitimacy repairing actions with their explanations are 
presented in chapter 5. To find further evidence on Volkswagen’s legitimacy management 
the firm’s actions are also evaluated on a time-perspective and from a stakeholder per-
spective. Hence, broadening the analysis to whether Volkswagen targeted some of its 
stakeholders with specific legitimacy repairing actions and whether its legitimacy man-
agement strategy develop over time. 
Crisis management is well known in academic literature and a lot of research has been 
published in the field (see e.g. Pearson & Clair 1998; Coombs 2015). Yet, as the academic 
business research evolves new strategies are crafted and others improved, and the ques-
tion of what successful crisis management strategies are is still imminent. By analysing 
Volkswagen’s apparently successful crisis management through the lenses of legitimacy 
management new empiric evidence can be established. By sorting out the legitimacy re-
pairing actions VW used in its crisis communication more insight can be gathered about 
remarkably effective and successful crisis management. These concluding results and 
their significance will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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2 VOLKSWAGEN’S EMISSIONS SCANDAL 
The German multinational car manufacturer Volkswagen has in the recent years been in 
the headlines for its involvement in one of the biggest company frauds in history, as it in 
September 2015 was found to have used cheat devices and software in its diesel engines 
to achieve lower emissions results. The cheat device was engineered to drastically change 
the performance of the engine to improve results during emissions tests. This allowed 
VW to sell apparently low-emitting cars on markets with strict emissions limits. (Hotten 
2015.) The illegal actions of VW clearly overstepped the grey zone of engineering best 
results for the emissions tests only, as its cars did not even comply with the limits during 
the test if the cheat device was not activated.  
2.1 Background of the emissions scandal 
The seeds for Volkswagen’s emissions scandal were planted nearly a decade before the 
outburst of the scandal, when VW set up a plan of gaining a larger share of United States 
car market. VW had previously been struggling to sell its cars to American customers and 
needed new solutions that could make its cars more likable. VW choose to invest in the 
segment of fuel-efficient cars and introduce new car models with fuel-efficient diesel en-
gines to the American market. (Ewing 2017.)  
The choice to concentrate on low consuming engines was driven by the steep price 
increase of gasoline on the US market during the six years that proceeded the financial 
crisis of 2008, when the gasoline price had increased by over 250 % (Statista 2018). 
Therefore, VW acquired early success with its new fuel-efficient diesel engines, which 
were marketed as “clean diesel” and were introduced as environmentally friendly alter-
natives to its competitors’ less fuel-efficient products (Ewing 2017).  
As a European car manufacturer VW had much experience of striving for fuel-effi-
ciency, and thus also low carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.2 The reason for this was the 
different legislative emissions standards that were in use in the US and in the EU. EU 
legislation has striven to lower the greenhouse gases emitted by cars on its single market. 
The mission of the US federal car emissions regulator, Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), is however to protect human health and the environment rather than combating 
climate change per se. In contrast to the EU rules and standards, which are set to mitigate 
greenhouse gases as CO2, the US standards are more calibrated to combat local air quality 
pollutants as nitrogen oxides (NOx) and are far less ambitious in regulating CO2 emis-
                                                 
2 The CO2 emissions of a car’s internal combustion engine mostly go hand in hand with the fuel-efficiency 
of a car as CO2 gases are emitted through the combustion of gasoline. (Nesbit et al. 2016) 
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sions. Consequently, car engines manufactured and designed for the EU market are usu-
ally more fuel-efficient and stricter on CO2 emissions but attach less attention to the local 
air quality pollutants. (Nesbit et al. 2016, 9–10.)  
The opposing regulation between EU and the US is specifically clear for diesel cars, 
for which up to two times higher levels of air quality pollutants (NOx) are allowed in the 
EU than in the US (Table 1), as they are more fuel-efficient than petrol cars. (Nesbit et 
al. 2016, 15.)  
Table 1 Comparison of emissions standards for pollutants in the US and EU 
(Nesbit et al. 2016, 15) 
  
Emissions standards for pollutants 
(g/km) US EU 
Local air 
quality  
pollutants 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) 0,04 0,06/0,08* 
Non-methane organic gases (NMOG) 0,06 0,07/na* 
Carbon monoxide (CO) 2,61 1,0/0,5* 
Greenhouse 
gases 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2, in 2016) 155 130 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2, in 2020) 132 95 
Form of vehicle emissions testing FTP NEDC 
*petrol / diesel standards     
Federal Test Procedure (FTP)     
New European Driving Cycle (NEDC)     
 
EU’s standpoint to regulate petrol and diesel differently reflects on historical evolution 
of the European car market. EU has seen diesel cars as a way for reducing CO2 emissions 
and has built the European standards with this in mind. Today about half of all cars in EU 
are diesel cars whereas only a small minority of the US cars are diesel driven. NOx emis-
sions are much harder to reduce than the CO2 gases in diesel cars and therefore they have 
a looser regulation than petrol cars in the EU. US regulation again are technology neutral 
between petrol and diesel cars and is more fixated on the local air quality pollutants. 
(Nesbit et al. 2016, 15.) 
2.2 Volkswagen pleads guilty to charges in the US 
Much of the details to the diesel scandal have been revealed through the investigations of 
the US authorities and research institutions since the beginning of the crisis, but when 
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VW decided to plead guilty and made a plea agreement with US federal court investigat-
ing the matter, a clear analysis of the events could be pictured. The following explanation 
of the diesel scandal is mostly based on the facts reviewed in connection to the sentence 
VW received by the US federal court on the 21.04.2017. The car company was sentenced 
on all three accounts it was accused of: 1) conspiracy to defraud the United States, engage 
in wire fraud, and violate the Clean Air Act; 2) obstruction of justice; and 3) importation 
of merchandise by means of false statements. (Volkswagen AG Sentenced – – 2017.) The 
plea for guilty was, however, just the one step in the long legal proceeding against VW 
in the US and around the world. 
In 2006 when VW had its new fuel-efficient diesel engines ready for production the 
firm knew, that it would not pass the stricter emissions standards of EPA. Managers at 
VW nevertheless decided to continue with the production of the car and marketed it as an 
environmentally-friendly “clean diesel” for the US market. At that point, in 2006, it be-
came clear for VW’s engineers that they could not yet design a diesel car that was both 
fuel-efficient and stayed inside the permitted emissions boundaries. However, as real us-
age testing was uncommon and expensive for regulators at this time, VW knew that the 
risk of being caught was quite small. Managers at VW nevertheless decided to continue 
with the production of the car. What they hoped for was that technological improvement 
would make it possible to lower the emissions and thus solve the problem in the future. 
(Ewing 2016; Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty – – 2017; Leggett 2017.)  
In the meantime, the managers and technicians tasked with bringing the car to the 
market opted for an illegal fix. Their solution was to design an engine management soft-
ware, called a “cheat device”, which would notice when the car was being tested and 
temporarily turn on emissions controls for the car. With the cheat device installed the car 
automatically detected when it was being tested and switched to a low emissions mode, 
where the emissions where on a satisfactory level. This would permit the car to pass the 
required emissions tests, without being too expensive or difficult to produce. A constant 
usage of the engine management software would, however, have increased stress on the 
engine and caused hardware failure, so it was designed to only turn on and function during 
testing. As a result, the vehicles could emit up to 35 times higher levels of NOx than were 
allowed in the US. (Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty – – 2017.)  
The use of cheat devices was many times questioned in VW’s internal correspondence 
by engineers during the years following its introduction in 2006, but the practice was 
allowed to be continued by senior supervisors. As technological improvements on the 
motors itself where not feasible, mostly due to the increased cost of physical changes to 
the motors, the use of the cheat device became a standard at VW. To decrease the possi-
bility of getting caught, improvements where even made to the software, so that it would 
better detect if the emissions-testing was started. This was done as late as in 2014, by e.g. 
adding functionalities that could detect the movement of the steering wheel. If the steering 
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wheel was not turned the software could identify that is was tested for emissions. 
(Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty – – 2017.) 
2.3 Outbreak of the scandal on the US market 
The discovery of VW’s fraud was eventually made by a group of researchers in the US. 
Environmental researchers had begun to wonder, how diesel vehicles emit less NOx gases 
in the US than in the Europe. As they were produced by the same manufacturer, the ques-
tion aroused, why the manufacturer did not use same emissions reducing technologies on 
both continents. (McGee 2017.) 
A collaborative research project by an independent non-profit institute, International 
Council on Clean Transport (ICCT) and the Center for Alternative Fuels, Engines & 
Emissions (CAFEE) from West Virginia University was started in 2013 (Ewing 2016b). 
Its aim was “to conduct in-use testing of three light-duty diesel vehicles, using a portable 
emissions measurement system”. The portable emissions measurement system was con-
nected to the car’s exhaust pipe and could therefore test the real emissions when the car 
was driven on the streets and highways. (Thompson et al. 2014, ii.) Regulators as EPA 
have historically relied on laboratory tests for car emissions and thus such a real-life re-
search of cars emissions could, perhaps, share some novel information of the real emis-
sions emitted during driving (Ewing 2016b). 
The researchers conducted their tests on the three cars and found that there was a huge 
discrepancy between the laboratory tested emissions and the real-world NOx emissions, 
which could be up to 35 times higher than permitted, for two of the tree cars tested. 
(Thompson et al. 2014, 106.) Both of those cars were Volkswagen’s vehicles. Even 
though the researchers had discovered that VW’s cars continuously under-performed in 
the real-world testing “they attributed it to technical defects or design flaws rather than to 
a deliberate” fraud by VW. As the sample was small and the researchers did not believe 
that they had made a ground-breaking discovery, the research group just ordinarily pre-
sented their results at an industry conference in 2014. However, when their research was 
published, they sent their results to the EPA and to VW for reviewal. (Ewing 2016b.)   
The environmental officials at EPA and also at California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) took the results seriously and started rigorous tests on all VW diesel cars sold in 
the US. The investigations of EPA and CARB continued for over a year, as they tried to 
uncover the reason for the discrepancies in the emissions results of VW’s cars. As the 
officials asked for reasons for the too high emissions from VW, the company answered 
with false explanations and blamed innocent technical problems in the testing. Eventually 
the regulators achieved solid proof of VW’s fraud and announced it publicly 18.09.2015. 
(McGee 2017.) This publication sets the stage for the emissions crisis, to which 
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Volkswagen responded with its first press release acknowledging the emissions cheating 
with a cheat device.  
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3 SUCHMAN’S LEGITIMACY MANAGEMENT FRAME-
WORK 
The theoretical framework is the analytical lenses of this research, through which the 
research problem is evaluated. They give direction and the framework for the analysis of 
the empirical data which has been gathered for this research. Legitimacy theory and Such-
man’s legitimacy management framework are chosen as the main theory and framework 
for this research.   
3.1 Legitimacy theory 
Early adopters of legitimacy theory as Shocker and Sethi (1973, 97), saw the operation 
of all social institutions to be bound by a social contract, which assured the institution’s 
survival and growth based on two factors, “the twin test of legitimacy”. This social con-
tract could be firmly expressed or only implied, but the organisation would in both cases 
have to follow it. Firstly on “the delivery of some socially desirable ends to society in 
general”, and secondly on “the distribution of economic, social, or political benefits to 
groups from which it derives its power”. In a transforming and dynamic environment 
institutions that wish to meet these demands must continuously demonstrate their rele-
vance to the society and acquire the society’s approval. Corporations and other organisa-
tions are no exception of these social institutions, which are all bound by this social con-
tract.  
The classical economic theory suggests that firms in a market economy would pass the 
legitimacy test by satisfying the market demand. However, flawed market mechanisms, 
changing public expectations and growing concerns on negative business externalities 
cannot sufficiently be outweighed by simply answering to market demands. (Shocker & 
Sethi 1973, 97–98.) The reasoning in the 1970s indicates a change from an earlier position 
where economic performance and success was simply seen to be rewarded with legiti-
macy. This change arose from society’s rising demands on firms to account for the social 
issues related to business’ operations. For firms this meant a broadened obligation to fol-
low the public policy processes of the society and not only the legal demands on the firm. 
(Patten 1992, 471–472.)  
Maurer defined legitimacy as “the process whereby an organisation justifies to a peer 
or superordinate system its right to exist” (Maurer 1971, 361, based on Suchman 1991, 
573). Hence giving a definition on the legitimation process, which is clearly bound to the 
legitimacy of an organisation. It does, however, not give a definition on what legitimacy 
is and how this process is to be executed. Ashforth and Gibbs give a definition on what a 
legitimate organisation is: “an organisation is perceived legitimate if it pursues socially 
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accepted goals in a socially accepted manner” (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990, 177, based on 
Suchman 1991, 573). This definition on a legitimate organisation explains what an or-
ganisation has to do to be perceived legitimate: it will have to act according to socially 
accepted standards and follow socially accepted norms. Yet those definitions fall still 
short of explaining how an organisation can strive for legitimacy in practice.  
Legitimacy has since been defined by many researchers, but one broadly accepted def-
inition on organisational legitimacy that incorporates the role of social audience in the 
legitimation dynamics is given in the seminal research by Mark Suchman (1995, 574; see 
e.g. Grolin 1998; Palazzo & Scherer 2006; Erkama & Vaara 2010; Desai 2011; Claasen 
& Roloff 2012; Carnegie & O’Connell 2012; Dumay et al. 2015).  
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially con-
structed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. 
This definition is quite comprehensive, as it includes several defining components on 
legitimacy. An organisation’s legitimacy is generalised in that it is dependent on the sum 
of the entity’s performance, thus the organisation can partly deviate from the expected 
societal norms and still retain its legitimacy if those deviations are perceived as excep-
tional. The interpretation of an organisation’s legitimacy are perceptions and assump-
tions, as it represents subjective reactions of an observer. Hence, the organisation may 
diverge from the societal norms and still maintain its legitimacy if those divergences are 
unnoticed. While legitimacy represents a congruence between a social group with shared 
beliefs and the behaviour of an organisation it is also socially constructed. The approval 
or disapproval of the collective audience is significant for the understanding of an organ-
isation’s legitimacy and thus an organisation can act in contrast to values of individuals 
as long as it does not conflict with the public interpretation. Therefore, the legitimacy of 
an organisation is dependent on the pattern of behaviour that is generally perceived and 
accepted as legitimate by a group of observers. This perception does not have to be ac-
cepted by all individuals and the perception can change if the observers were to gain more 
insight of the organisation’s behaviour. (Suchman 1995, 574.) 
There are many reasons for corporations to pursue legitimacy, as legitimacy benefits 
a firm in many ways. It increases the stability of organisations as people are more likely 
to support and meet the demands of organisations that are assessed as legitimate. It also 
adds to the understanding of an organisations comprehensibility as legitimate organisa-
tions are seen as more trustworthy, more predictable and more meaningful. (Suchman 
1995, 574–575.) Keeping this in mind; illegitimate organisations could hence be consid-
ered untrustworthy and irrational in their actions and the necessity of the organisation’s 
existence could be questioned.   
The legitimacy of a firm can be disputed if its actions are in conflict with the percep-
tions of right and wrong of the society. Such conflict of actions and perceptions are for 
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example financial scandals, human rights violations, negative environmental externalities 
(e.g. pollution and waste dumping) and collaboration with repressive regimes (Palazzo 
and Scherer 2006, 71). These are such problematic aspects that would arise questions 
about the alignment of the societal needs and the actions of the firm. Depending on the 
needs of the firm and its situation, it can either strive for legitimacy actively or passively 
(Suchman 1995, 575), as legitimacy can be seen as a resource. With this legitimacy the 
firm can guarantee its existence. (Palazzo & Scherer 2006, 72).  
3.2 Thematic types of organisational legitimacy 
To gain a more thorough understanding of legitimacy Suchman (1995, 577) distinguishes 
between three thematic types of organisational legitimacy: the pragmatic, moral and cog-
nitive legitimacy. The groups are also interlinked and sometimes overlapping, but each 
type of legitimacy is based on different behavioural dynamics. 
3.2.1 Pragmatic legitimacy 
Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the calculations of the organisation’s self-interested stake-
holders and broader audience. This means that the audience examines and evaluates the 
organisation’s behaviour based on the consequences for themselves. Legitimacy will be 
attributed to organisations which stakeholders perceive to benefit them, either by ex-
change legitimacy or influence legitimacy. Exchange legitimacy can be as straightfor-
ward as a give-and-take exchange between the organisation and its audience, let it be 
individuals or other organisations. Influence legitimacy is entitled to organisations that 
represent the broader interests of the audience in some field. A third variant is disposi-
tional legitimacy which is dependent on shared values where legitimacy is attributed to 
organisations that are assumed to share the same values and act in the best interest of the 
audience. (Suchman 1995, 578–579.)  
These three forms of pragmatic legitimacy all have in common that legitimacy is at-
tributed to organisations because the audience perceive benefiting from the organisation. 
The organisation may try to accumulate such legitimacy e.g. through incorporating some 
of the audience’s opinions into its own policies or by strategically manipulating the per-
ceptions on the organisation to better align with the one wanted by the constituents. It can 
also be done through direct payments or benefits to the audience. (Palazzo & Scherer 
2006, 72.)  
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3.2.2 Moral legitimacy  
Moral legitimacy is a more utilitarian way for evaluating the actions of an organisation. 
Instead of evaluating the benefits of actions, moral legitimacy comes through the judge-
ment whether the organisation’s actions are “the right thing to do” and thus producing 
socially valued consequences. This judgement is based on the evaluator’s socially con-
structed values and idea of societal welfare and hence more resistant to narrow self-inter-
est and pragmatic consideration (Suchman 1995, 579–580).  
Moral legitimacy can be evaluated on four disciplines. Firstly, through evaluations of 
outputs and consequences of an organisation’s accomplishments. The consequences of 
all actions cannot always be easily determined, because of their impact is spread on a 
longer time frame or if the outcomes are not easily measurable. The second way, i.e. the 
procedural legitimacy, is therefore to evaluate the used techniques and procedures of an 
organisation, thus enabling an organisation to gather moral legitimacy through socially 
accepted practices. If the organisation’s actions are perceived to be valuable the achieve-
ments do not even have to visible. Thirdly, some structural characteristics of organisations 
can be seen to be valuable in themselves and gain support from an audience. This type of 
moral legitimacy is described as categorical and structural legitimacy and is much like 
procedural legitimacy, with the difference that in it the whole organisation is evaluated. 
Some organisations can be seen to fulfil a function in themselves and are therefore sup-
ported. A fourth form is personal legitimacy, where the leaders and representatives of an 
organisation are evaluated. It rests on the personal charisma of specific leaders and is 
bound to those individuals. This type of moral legitimacy is not as common as the earlier 
three forms of moral legitimacy, but still valuable in the observation of an organisation’s 
legitimacy. (Suchman 1995, 581–582.) 
3.2.3 Cognitive legitimacy 
Cognitive legitimacy is clearly distinct from the two earlier mentioned types of legiti-
macy, i.e. from pragmatic legitimacy which is driven from an interest and from moral 
legitimacy which is based on an ethical evaluation. Cognitive legitimacy is created on a 
subconscious level and displayed as comprehensibility or taken-for-grantedness. Legiti-
macy that comes from comprehensibility will be given to organisations that are under-
standable and operate based on a culturally accepted model. This means that there have 
to be an existing understanding of the organisation and its activities amongst the organi-
sation’s stakeholders. Such understanding can be acquired through consistency with the 
wider belief systems and the everyday life of the audience. Cognitive legitimacy which 
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originates from taken-for-grantedness is described as the most powerful source of legiti-
macy, as any other option is unthinkable for the stakeholders and audience. Such legiti-
macy comes from a situation where any other alternative is literally impossible and un-
thinkable, and the legitimacy of an organisation is therefore untouchable. Such situations 
are, however, rare and hard to strive for, as society, technology, and culture are constantly 
in a state of flux in a dynamic market economy and democracy. (Suchman 1995, 582–
583.)  
3.3 Legitimacy repairing strategies  
As pragmatic, moral, and cognitive differ from each other, few organisations strive to 
fulfil all of them at the same time with the same amount of workload. With the differen-
tiation of the three major types of legitimacy it is possible to distinguish between different 
legitimisation themes. It comes well in hand when legitimisation operations are analysed 
as it helps to differentiate the diverse goals of corporate actions. However, it is clear that 
no organisation can all the time and, in all situations, satisfy all audiences, and thus fig-
uratively step outside the legitimacy evaluation. (Suchman 1995, 585.) Therefore, organ-
isations must make prisonisations between adaption to the distinct legitimacy strategies. 
 As most cultural processes, the perception of the firm by its stakeholders can be in-
fluenced through communication. Well planned and executed communication can help 
the organisations to make a big difference in the way it is evaluated by the audience as a 
desirable and appropriate organisation. This communication is, however, not only tradi-
tional one-way disclosure, but rather consists of a multitude of different organisational 
messages, as actions, disclosures and non-verbal displays. A well-managed legitimacy 
management uses a wide range of different actions and possesses a high level of under-
standing of the possible legitimation responses to different situations. (Suchman 1995, 
585–586.)  
Depending on the organisation’s legitimation needs different strategies can be utilised. 
An organisation may either need to gain, maintain, or repair its legitimacy. Those three 
perspectives decide for the actions and techniques the organisation can use when it tries 
to alter its pragmatic, moral, or cognitive legitimacy. (Suchman 1995, 586.)  
Organisations faced with a crisis will need to repair their legitimacy if they have failed 
to either gain enough legitimacy or maintain their existing legitimacy. As a reactive re-
sponse repairing legitimacy functions best for crisis management or as a response to an 
unlikely event, in contrast to gaining or maintaining legitimacy. In the event of a major 
legitimation crisis organisations tend to fall into a self-reinforcing loop of fall-backs, 
which reduces the audience’s and allies’ support for the organisation. The failure to fulfil 
the expectations of the wider public or some important stakeholder group can lead to loss 
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of long-standing allies, because legitimacy is mostly reciprocal and partly shared through 
networks. The allies will thus alienate themselves from the organisation in question, as 
they risk a negative contamination. Such actions could inflict considerable harm, if for 
example an organisation’s critical resource flows were to be interrupted to the organisa-
tion. (Suchman 1995, 597.) Such critical resource flows are for example customers or 
new employees to the firm. Therefore, legitimacy is important for all firms. As the goal 
of all organisations in crisis are to regain their lost legitimacy, this aspect fits best for this 
thesis. Therefore, only the task of repairing legitimacy will be presented here more 
closely. 
After a major negative incident an organisation will have to address the immediate 
threat of losing legitimacy through legitimacy repairing actions. After the initial crisis is 
dealt with the organisation may go back to the other legitimation activities. In the wake 
of the crisis it is particularly important to build a wedge between the past action, which is 
assessed as illegitimate by the audience and the ongoing (better) practices. General prop-
ositions for legitimacy management in those situations are to offer normalising accounts, 
restructure, and to avoid panic. The motive with the offering of a normalising account is 
to separate the legitimacy breach from the larger evaluation of the organisation’s legiti-
macy. There is a grave danger in not reacting to a threatening revelation, as audiences 
will begin to suspect all other activities of the firm and even turn against its desirable 
outputs. (Suchman 1995, 597–598.) The actions should both be straightforward and ef-
fective yet also sensitive to the audiences’ reactions (Suchman 1995, 599). The proposi-
tion not to panic should be interpreted as a general rule not to make too swift actions by 
e.g. making large restructurings in the firm without understanding the situation well 
enough. Too sudden and unplanned changes that are soon reversed would further reduce 
the trust on the firm’s actions. Table 2 summarises the legitimacy management frame-
work for repairing legitimacy. It is a combination of the three distinctive thematic types 
of legitimacy combined with corresponding managerial actions that help an organisation 
to repair legitimacy (Suchman 1995, 600). The actions are meant to be responses to the 
three different legitimacy aspects and are grouped based on how well they respond to 
them.   
24 
 
Table 2 The legitimacy management framework (based on Suchman 1995, 600) 
Legitimacy management framework 
Themes Actions 
Pragmatic legitimacy 
Deny 
Create monitors 
Moral legitimacy 
Excuse 
Justify 
Replace personnel 
Revise practices 
Reconfigure 
Cognitive legitimacy Explain 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy, which is mostly based on the audience’s self-interest, is combined 
with the acts of denial and creating monitors. As stakeholders base their assessment of 
the organisation’s actions on a utility calculation a blunt denial of any wrongdoing may 
go unnoticed if there are pragmatic reasons for this. The same applies to the creation of 
monitors. A firm can invite a monitor or a watchdog, i.e. the organisation can call for new 
public regulation or call for an ombudsperson to oversee the correction of any faults. 
Those actions would perhaps not repair legitimacy immediately, but on a pragmatic level 
it might persuade some audiences that they can safely return to normal relations. (Pfeffer 
1981, based on Suchman 1995, 598.) 
Moral legitimacy management requires more utilitarian responses to crisis, such as 
excusing, justifying, replacing personnel, revising practices or reconfiguring. A firm may 
excuse for their actions and hope for forgiveness, at least on a personal level from its 
stakeholders if not on a legislative level. The excuse can, however, also be a way of ques-
tioning the organisation’s responsibility by blaming individual employees or practices 
without taking the whole blame on the organisation itself. A firm may also try to justify 
its past actions by reverting the purpose of the firm in retrospect. Thus, it could easier 
appear constant with the stakeholder’s moral beliefs. The three other actions are meant to 
disassociate the firm from the disruptive incident. By replacing the guilty employees or 
executives it can try continuing from a clean slate and communicate a wish for change. 
The same applies to revising non-desired practices and reconfiguring business operations. 
Such strategic restructuring can extend to closure of dubious operations or geographic 
locations. (Suchman 1995, 598.) As a way to regain some cognitive legitimacy the man-
agers can try to merely explain the event so that the firm can preserve at least some of its 
support. (Suchman 1995, 598.)  
25 
 
3.4 Empirical applications of legitimacy management framework 
Suchman’s legitimacy management framework has been described as the point of refer-
ence for legitimacy management in literature (Claasen & Roloff 2012) and it is widely 
used in studies analysing different sorts of crisis management situations. To understand 
the broad variety of research, for which Suchman’s framework has been used a few in-
teresting examples are presented.  
One example of research based on Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy management action 
typology is a historical case study. The study examines how two Australian professional 
accounting bodies responded to a financial, corporate, and regulatory crisis in the 1960s. 
The study is conducted on historical evidence in the form of minutes from conferences 
held by the bodies to discuss and defend the accounting profession’s legitimacy. It exam-
ines which key thematical forms of legitimacy were focused on and which actions used 
to defend the accounting bodies’ legitimacy. The study established pragmatic legitimacy 
to have been in key focus of attention whereas moral and cognitive legitimacy were less 
significant. (Carnegie & O’Connell 2012) 
 Another case study conducted by Claasen and Roloff (2012) aims to fill a research 
gap regarding the question whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices con-
tributes to organisational legitimacy. By analysing stakeholder interviews with the help 
of Suchman’s (1995) cognitive, pragmatic and moral legitimacy management typology, 
they concluded that moral legitimacy was more relevant than cognitive and pragmatic 
legitimacy for the overall legitimacy of a company. Thus, the authors call for more com-
parable studies to be able to quantify the relative importance of the three thematical as-
pects of legitimacy management presented by Suchman (1995), as no earlier research had 
predicted this particular difference. (Claasen & Roloff 2012.) 
Researchers Dumay, Frost, and Beck (2015) have elaborated the framework by devel-
oping a model of legitimacy management where Suchman’s (1995) institutional and stra-
tegic perspectives of legitimacy are combined into “material legitimacy”. In the case 
study, the researchers analyse two organisations’ disclosures of non-financial infor-
mation. The presented new form of legitimacy would enable organisations to align the 
organisation’s (strategic legitimacy) and its stakeholders’ (institutional legitimacy) con-
cerns together. (Dumay et al. 2015.) 
Suchman’s (1995) framework on legitimacy management has also been criticised by 
researchers. Results from a longitudinal qualitative study on large-scale changes in pub-
lic-sector health care show that after an optimum level of legitimacy has been achieved 
further focus on legitimacy management may lead to mismanagement of stakeholders. 
Another key finding is that the need and sort of legitimacy management actions of an 
organisation can change with time. The research was conducted as a content analysis of 
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annual reports from health institutions, government documents, and newspaper accounts 
to get insight of the studied time period. (Sonpar et al. 2010.) 
The findings of Baumann-Pauly, Scherer and Palazzo (2016) draw attention to a di-
lemma or paradox in Suchman’s (1995) framework on legitimacy management. When 
corporations strive to repair their legitimacy, the actions might satisfy one stakeholder 
group’s demands but simultaneously violate another’s. Their research shows, that suc-
cessful legitimacy management requires corporations to internally coordinate their crisis 
response strategies to various stakeholder groups. Corporations also communicate differ-
ently to various types of stakeholders. (Baumann-Pauly et al. 2016.)  
As these recent examples of research show, the legitimacy management framework 
can be used for a wide variety of types of research in many fields of science. The re-
searches often deal with crisis and their management in different ways and their method-
ological choices are comparable with this research. As such, Suchman’s legitimacy man-
agement framework can also be regarded as suitable for this research. It is also notewor-
thy that earlier research has found Suchman’s framework lacking in some aspects or the 
researchers have elaborated the framework further. This means that although Suchman’s 
approach is commonly applied it can still be further developed and improved. 
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The purpose of the research was to study Volkswagen’s crisis management after the emer-
gence of the emissions crisis through its crisis communication and to gain deeper under-
standing on how legitimacy management was used to repair legitimacy after a serious 
crisis that threatened the car manufacturer’s core business. For deeper understanding of 
how organisations may repair their legitimacy this study concentrates on analysing the 
different actions for repairing legitimacy which are found in the research data consisting 
of Volkswagen’s press releases. The theoretical framework gives the basis for interpreta-
tion of the data and in the creation of the analysis. This chapter clarifies the methodolog-
ical choices made prior and during the research process and the reasoning behind them.  
The research setting of this real-life event, from where the goal is to acquire as com-
prehensive and objective understanding as possible calls for a qualitative research ap-
proach combined with systematic content analysis as research method, which will hence 
be used in this study for the analysis and interpretation (see e.g. Hirsjärvi et a. 1997, 157; 
Corbin & Strauss 2008, 12–13; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 105). These decisions will af-
fect, among other things, the type of empirical data usage, the ways the data can be ana-
lysed, the rules on how the data can be interpreted and even the ways in which the con-
clusions can be presented in the following sections. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 6, 11–
12).  
4.1 Using press releases as research data 
The research setting of this study required that the research data overlapped with the out-
break moment of the emissions scandal. It was also important that the source for the data 
was closely connected to the company, so that the data was not influenced by other actors 
than Volkswagen. Therefore, the empirical data for this research was collected from 
Volkswagen’s web pages and consists of press releases released by the company imme-
diately after the scandal. The choice to use existing empirical data released by VW as the 
thesis’ primary data was natural, as the research problem required material that could best 
describe the actions, thoughts and words of the company itself, without outside interfer-
ence. The research question in itself commanded for data, where the company itself was 
the producer of the data. Hence, company press releases can be seen as a most relevant 
source of data for this research. (Koskinen et al. 2005, 131; Saranen-Kauppinen & 
Puusniekka 2006; Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 77–78.) Another option would have been 
to conduct extensive interviews with the executives involved in the scandal, but that was 
at the time of writing and in this scope of the research not viable. Furthermore, 
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Volkswagen failed to answer to any email sent to the communication representatives of 
the company early on during the research process.  
Press releases are public information statements, written and released voluntarily by 
companies, with the aim to inform the public of something important for the firm. They 
represent the firm’s subjective view and are written by experienced communication ex-
perts with the goal to create a comprehensive and understandable picture of the firm’s 
internal and external situation and support the broader message Volkswagen wanted to 
share. They are aimed for the general public, including investors, customers, public offi-
cials, but also employees and other stakeholders. (Investopedia Press Releases 2018.) The 
press releases published by VW provide an informative and compact view on the infor-
mation VW released during the crisis. (Koskinen et al. 2005, 131). Press releases work as 
adequate primary sources for information especially when analysing official policies and 
arguments. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2018, 131). Although not as strictly regulated as 
quarterly earnings reports or annual reports3 of firms, publicly traded companies have 
certain requirements to publish material information in their press releases. They are for 
example not allowed to disclose false information or mislead the public and must publish 
information that would have significant impact on the result of the firm. (Markkinoiden 
väärinkäyttöaseusta koskevat ohjeet 2016, 5; SEC Disclosure Laws and Regulations 
2018; Transparency requirements for listed companies 2018.) Keeping in mind the pur-
pose and context for which the press releases where produced and the legislative require-
ments they can be evaluated appropriate for this study (Saranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 
2006).  
The collected data consists of 24 press releases and one transcription of the CEO’s 
speech, which was published on the same page as the press releases and will be treated 
alongside the press releases and referred to as one of them. All of the documents were 
published by VW on its global homepage and can be found from the Volkswagen News-
room sub-page (www.volkswagen-newsroom.com/en). VW has gathered all its press re-
leases to the same page and lists them chronologically and thematically. To systematically 
gather the press releases concerning the emissions scandal the page offers a search engine 
that finds thematically marked press releases. By combining a timeframe (search start day 
set to the beginning of the scandal) and various word combinations, as “diesel issue” or 
“emissions crisis” all press releases about the emissions scandal could be gathered. No 
other than press releases that were related to the emissions scandal were included in the 
data sample. A comprehensive list of the used search terms can be found in Appendix 1.  
Only English press releases were presented on the global page of VW, but a similar 
search procedure on the German pages of VW gained the same result. A comparison of a 
few of the press releases in German showed that the press releases on the global page 
                                                 
3 No quarterly earnings reports nor annual reports where included in the research data, as they did not fit 
into the chosen timeframe for the gathering of the data. 
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were either word-for-word translations or originals. It is most likely that even though the 
firm has its corporate main office in Germany all press releases regarding the emissions 
scandal were publicised in both languages. Thus, it can be concluded that to a high cer-
tainty the first 25 press releases about on the emissions scandal are all included in the 
research data. 
The date range for the collected documents was not decided before the coding of the 
documents was started. The emissions issue has a clear starting point in the first press 
release concerning the scandal by VW on the 20.09.2015, but no clear end point can be 
given, especially as the scandal is still going on, with the latest “diesel issue” marked 
press release publicised on 16.10.2018 (VW press release 2018). As a highly dynamic 
situation the “end” of the crisis was thus hard to define, as new evidence of the scandal 
was found all the time, which always triggered new responses from VW. However, as the 
aim is to analyse how VW tried to repair legitimacy in the wake of the crisis a quite short 
time frame was set. Even though a definitive end point for a crisis cannot be defined, it is 
clear that as a phenomenon crisis eases with time and if the firm survives the crisis, it 
moves to a new state of normal. After initial analyses of 22 press releases three more were 
added to the data set, to add further important material. This brought the overall number 
of press releases to 25 and also added some of the first results of Volkswagen’s internal 
investigation’s results to the analysed data. The last three press releases were quite sig-
nificant, with titles: “CO2 issue largely concluded” (09.12.2015), “Volkswagen making 
good progress with its investigation, technical solutions and Group realignment” 
(10.12.2015), and “NOx issue: customers are being informed, implementation is starting” 
(16.12.2015). That extended the timeline of the gathered data from the 20. September to 
the end of December and thus spanning a timeframe of approximately one quarter of a 
year.  
As earlier mentioned, the scandal is still ongoing, and the end of 2015 was actually not 
even the beginning of the end for the events of the scandal per se, but it can nevertheless 
be used as end point for the analysis. In hindsight the crisis can be seen to have moved to 
a new phase after this, which also changed Volkswagen’s communication pattern. Figure 
1 shows a clear decrease of press releases from September to December. However, the 
decrease is even more steep, when taking into account that the first month of the crisis 
(September) only consisted of 10 days of actual crisis as the first press release was pub-
lished on the 20.09.2015. Hence, when comparing the frequency of the press releases 
during the timeline of the crisis the statistic shows that on average in September one press 
releases was sent out per day, and in December only one every ten days. 
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Figure 1 Time distribution of sample press releases 2015 
The shortest of the press releases was less than a half page long and the longest five pages 
long, with most of the press releases ranging between one and two pages in length. The 
texts are written in plain text, without any pictures or tables, including VW’s opinions 
and direct quotations from its representatives. An example of a press release can be found 
in Appendix 2. 
4.2 Data analysis on Volkswagen’s press releases 
In considering the best way to process and analyse the gathered data qualitative content 
analysis was found to be the most appropriate method of research. Content analysis gives 
the researcher tools to analyse and find meanings from a large set of data, by categorising, 
combing and abstracting the textual data. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 105.) It works well 
with the chosen data sample, as the press releases cover a wide variety of topics, during 
a specific timeframe. Finding and defining categories makes the data more understanda-
ble and easier to categorise. 
4.2.1 Systematic content analysis as research method 
Qualitative content analysis can be conducted in many ways. It can either be theory 
driven, content driven or then it can be a combination of those. In this thesis, content 
classification is primarily based on the analysis framework presented in the theoretical 
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framework, although during the analysis new classifications were discovered and there-
fore added to the classification. A mix of theory and data-based classification gives more 
flexibility to find the most appropriate explanations to the discovered phenomena, as the 
theory can be supplemented with novel and important aspects from the data. This system-
atic content analysis based on theory and data gives the possibility to present the results 
of the analysis as quantitative statistic as well as verbally, as concepts. The systematic 
content analysis also dictates that the classification system is built based on the interaction 
of the theory and the data. (Seitamaa-Hakkarainen 2018.) Figure 2 presents the possible 
approaches for qualitative content analysis. 
 
Figure 2 Qualitative content analysis approaches (based on Seitamaa-Hakkarainen 
2018) 
The qualitative approach chosen also supports the decision to analyse the meaning of the 
content in the data, yet simultaneously giving the chance to present the results as statistics 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 105). The use of systematic content analysis as the research 
method is well fit for the purpose of this research, as the theory gives the frame for the 
classification and coding, which is then updated based on the found phenomena. As a 
result, the classification system is built through the interaction of theory and content.  
By compressing the data, the analysis can bring clarity to its interpretation, however 
without losing any important information. At the same time the goal is to create new 
knowledge. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 138–140.) Therefore, the aim is to produce concise 
descriptions on the phenomenon’s content that would connect the findings to the broader 
theoretical context that has been found in research. This means that VW’s effort to repair 
legitimacy should be attached to the larger body of legitimacy management research. As 
such the choice to use content analysis as the analysis method is suitable, as it has been 
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previously successfully used together with Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy management 
framework (see e.g. Sonpar et al. 2010). 
4.2.2 Conducting a systematic content analysis 
For use of systematic content analysis, a four-step procedure has to be conducted: (1) 
transforming data into text form, (2) developing a classification system and outlining a 
classification structure, (3) defining the analysis unit and segmentation of data, and (4) 
coding and reporting the data. (Seitamaa-Hakkarainen 2018). 
As content analysis can be used to analyse different forms of data, as pictures, sound 
or text it is important to transform the data into a form that can be analysed. A common 
approach is for example to gather material as interviews, which are then transcribed to 
text format for analysis. The data sample of press releases gathered for this research was 
conveniently already in text format. Furthermore, all of the press releases where seen as 
individual documents and were dealt with as discrete data. 
When developing the classification system, the codes and their classification guide-
lines for the analysis had to be decided on. To be able to code individual content into 
classes the guidelines were combined with the classification system. Based on the guide-
lines the data was then coded depending on its content into suitable classification catego-
ries. The base for this second step comes from the theoretical framework and research 
question, as they define how the data is classified. However, the creation of a classifica-
tion system requires thorough knowledge of data sample that shall be analysed, and it can 
change based on the content of the data. Therefore, the development of a classification 
system can be seen as a hermeneutic circle, where he classification system is all the time 
developed by specifying some of the classes, erasing others and even changing the mean-
ing of some classes based on the coding process. (Seitamaa-Hakkarainen 2018.) During 
the coding process a memo was written to document the changes to the classification 
system, as it was developed throughout the whole coding process. The memo helped in 
summarising the important decision made in the classification.  
The initial classification system (Table 2), presented in chapter 3, was built based on 
the theoretical framework concerning legitimacy management actions and complemented 
during the data analysis. The theoretical framework also guided the author in the classi-
fication of new codes under the pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy and cognitive 
legitimacy themes, as new categories were discovered. The final classification system and 
its classification guidelines (Table 3) can be seen in section 4.2.3.  
The third required step is to define an analysis unit and the segmentation of data. This 
is important, so that the relevant content can be handled in the same way. For this purpose, 
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everything from e.g. words, thoughts, sentences, themes or actions can be defined as anal-
ysis units. (Seitamaa-Hakkarainen 2018.) As the data consists of individual press releases, 
they could easily have been defined as analysis units. However, as each press release may 
contain a lot more than one topic it was better to define smaller entities as units of analy-
sis. As in all analysis of language and text with rich information, it is important to take 
into account that single sentences may have as important meanings as whole paragraphs. 
Thus, the analysis unit is defined as such a combination of words that bears a distinct 
clear meaning for which a code can be assigned. That would include everything from 
single words to longer paragraphs that alone form an entity. 
4.2.3 Coding and reporting in content analysis 
All the earlier steps are part of the last phase of systematic content analysis. The activity 
of coding and reporting the data includes two parts. Firstly, specifying individual analysis 
units from the data and labelling them (coding) with a code (reference) from the classifi-
cation system and secondly writing interpretations on the specific content (unit of analy-
sis) and on the whole group of similarly coded content (categories). (Seitamaa-
Hakkarainen 2018.) 
When coding, content with similar qualities or attributes are labelled with the same 
code into categories, and content with different qualities and attributes into different cat-
egories. This is done by comparison of analysis units. With the help of the classification 
guidelines the coding stays systematic and larger entities of similar content are created 
under specific categories. (Seitamaa-Hakkarainen 2018.)  
Coding can, however, also lead to the creation of new codes to the classification sys-
tem. This is a vital part of systematic content analysis as the content is not only seen 
through the theoretical framework, and coded with pre-defined codes, but the content can 
also steer the researcher in his choices. By identifying similar units of content that build 
a trend, new categories can be created to include these findings. Thus, the classification 
system is all the time incrementally corrected and reworked during the coding process. 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 117–118.) This highlights also one advantage of content anal-
ysis – new codes could be added to be included to the classification system when a need 
for that aroused, and by so sharpen the analysis of the data.  
Table 3 presents the final classification guidelines for categorisation of the analysis 
units. The categories (e.g. “deny” or “excuse”) are presented on their own rows with all 
of the meanings of the coded content that were coded into each category next to them.  
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Table 3 Final classification system of content analysis 
Category/ 
Code 
Classification guidelines 
Pragmatic legitimacy 
Deny New vehicles comply with legal requirements and environmental stand-
ards/are not affected 
The defeat device and cheat software does not affect handling, consump-
tion or emissions. 
CEO: …I am not aware of any wrong doing on my part. 
All vehicles are and remain technically safe and roadworthy. 
At no time was the safety of our customers compromised. 
Create mon-
itors 
Cooperation with relevant authorities 
Put employees at stage 
Submit voluntarily a complaint to the State Prosecutor, for criminal pro-
ceedings. 
Set up special committee for investigation. 
Commission outside lawyers for an objective investigation. 
Inform cus-
tomers 
Inform customers that their vehicles will be repaired 
Keep customers informed. 
Inform customers about the measures for their vehicles. 
Ensure customers that no cost will come upon them. 
Focus on customer friendliness 
Moral legitimacy 
Excuse Apology to customers, authorities, investors, employees and the general 
public. 
There is absolutely no excuse for the manipulations 
Ask for a chance to make amends. 
Justify - 
Replace 
personnel 
CEO takes responsibility and resigns. 
Appointment of new CEO 
New Chairman of the Supervisory Board. 
Appoint new top executives at brands and departments. 
Changes in Supervisory Board, Board of Management and Executive Com-
mittee. 
Suspension of managers and employees. 
Personnel responsible for misconduct must face severe consequences. 
A new team is in place to face the challenges. 
Revise 
practices 
New management model planned. 
More freedom for the Board to decide on Group strategy, development and 
steering. 
Realignment of Group’s culture and management behaviour. 
Changes to communication and handling of mistakes. 
Changes to company culture and focus for employees. 
Introduce 4-eyes principle and monitoring of employees. 
Sharpen responsibilities. 
Introduce external and independent emissions testing. 
Reduce CEO reports  
Reconfigure New organization structure to strengthen brands and regions accountability 
and independence. 
35 
 
New management structure with four regions. 
Give Group Board of Management more power for strategy and steering. 
Reorganization of activities in North America 
Align management structure with modular toolkits. 
Standardization, harmonization and streamlining of production processes, 
structures and corporate bodies. 
Scale back complexity of product range. 
Critical review of all planned investments. 
Intensify efficiency program. 
Make massive savings. 
Reorientation of diesel strategy. 
Introduce a modular electric toolkit for all-electric cars 
Introduce electric Phaeton 
Introduce new strategy 
Affirmation We do not tolerate violations of internal rules or of the law. 
The trust of our customers and the public is our most important asset. 
We will do everything that must be done to re-establish trust and reverse 
damage. 
Volkswagen is working full speed to clarify and eliminate irregularities 
concerning diesel engines. 
We will do everything with the greatest possible openness and transpar-
ency. 
I am shocked by the events and that it was possible in the Volkswagen 
Group. 
The company will call those responsible to account and take the necessary 
actions. 
We will develop the most stringent compliance and governance standards 
in our industry. 
“We will overcome this crisis” 
For Wolfsburg, that means production can continue. 
The efficiency program will be intensified. To be frank: this will not be a 
painless process. 
A digitalization and electrification offensive are being prepared.  
Cognitive legitimacy 
Explain Individualize affected vehicle models 
Present available information of the incident 
Inform markets and customers of affected vehicles. 
Inform the public on the progression of the incident’s investigation and 
findings. 
Explain reason for the misconduct. 
Technical 
solutions 
Present corrective measures for affected vehicles. 
 
It should be possible to categorise all coded content into the right category with the help 
of the classification guidelines. However, all coded content is not presented in the table 
as own sentences, as they were either identical or then similar enough to be easily recog-
nisable to belong to one of the categories based on the guidelines. Much thought was put 
to the best representation and inclusion of the content so that the guideline would be as 
comprehensive as possible. The classification has its base in the eight categories of the 
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initial classification system (Table 2) but has been expanded with three novel categories 
found through the analysis. The new categories found were “Inform customers”, “Affir-
mation”, and “Technical solutions”. The meaning and content of each category will be 
further explained in the following analysis chapter 5. 
The reporting is performed as interpretations of the data. The observations from the 
data cannot, in themselves, be seen as research results, but through the combination with 
the theoretical framework it is possible to reach the phenomena that is studied and give it 
some explanations. In content analysis, the synthesis and the analysis are combined: the 
data is divided into single units of analysis, which are then combined into scientific re-
sults. (Alasuutari 1999, 78–82.)  
Most of the reporting is performed as qualitative explanations of the themes of content 
found throughout the coding. Examples from descriptive pieces of text are used exten-
sively to explain, disclose, and frame findings and to make the Volkswagen’s communi-
cation easier to relate to. Statistical information, as frequencies of findings are also pre-
sented. Quantifying the findings helps to better present the results, as the data from the 
press releases is quite rich and diverse. The coding of the data is done with the help of a 
computer software, i.e. the program NVivo. NVivo is a purpose-built software for quali-
tative research, which made it easy for the researcher to store and organise large samples 
of data on the platform and also gave tools for categorising and analysing findings. Fur-
ther quantitative analysis was made with the program Microsoft Excel, by creating figures 
and tables of the findings. (Seitamaa-Hakkarainen 2018.) 
Neither the relative shares of the thematic legitimacy management actions nor the 
shares of the categorical actions can simply be presented as sufficient proof of signifi-
cance among Volkswagen’s crisis management actions, as a more content and meaning 
based analysis is required. It is vital to keep in mind that the core of qualitative content 
analysis is in the content and not in just occurrences of the categories. This becomes clear, 
when reviewing the coded content: some of the findings were short, one-line sentences 
as others could be whole paragraphs, with much more vivid meanings. In frequency list-
ings both codes were still listed as one instance. A further analysis on e.g. the word or 
letter count of the codes would, however, not bring much information when analysing the 
actions of Volkswagen in its communication. Again, this does not mean that quantitative 
analyses should not be performed on a rich data. It only emphasises the need to pay at-
tention to the qualitative findings and strive to qualify the findings found.  
Figure 3 illustrates the coding process of a sample press release. On the left-hand side 
of the figure the content of one press release can be seen. The yellow highlight indicates 
content that has been identified to belong to one of the defined categories and has thus 
been coded. On the right-hand side, running vertically along the page are the categories 
to which the data has been coded. Each of the colours indicate an individual category and 
each line an individual code.   
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Figure 3 Illustration of sample press release coding 
For quotation of the data a naming practice was set up. All documents were assigned a 
chronologically set number (1–25) and all coded content was divided into the classifica-
tion system’s categories. The content of all categories can be found categorically in Ap-
pendix 3 in the order of the press release’s appearance. For sake of clarity the coded con-
tent is referred to with a code that consists of the document’s number and the order of the 
content under each category. For example, the third unit of analysis coded with the label 
“excuse” from the second press release would have the code (3:2). As such the quotations 
will include many references with the same number, but as all quotations are presented 
connected with their category this coding procedure was chosen as the clearest and easiest 
way to refer to the coded content. 
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4.3 Establishing trustworthiness of the study 
It is clear that all scientific writings require a level of trustworthiness. If the research fails 
to establish a minimum level of trustworthiness, it cannot be seen to prove its conclusions 
and results and falls into the definition of subjective opinions. Thus, ensuring a sufficient 
level of quality and trustworthiness in one’s research results must be seen as a key feature 
for all research. 
Many concepts have been defined to establish the trustworthiness of research. The 
basic concepts or criteria for such an evaluation are validity and reliability, which are 
especially used among quantitative research. However, due to this research’s approach, 
setting other criteria more suitable for this research has been chosen instead. The concepts 
of dependability, transferability, credibility and conformability are aspects that can en-
sure trustworthiness of a qualitative study. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2018, 294.) 
Dependability refers to the need for the process of research to be “logical, traceable 
and documented” (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2018, 294). This has, indeed, been kept in 
mind in describing all phases of the research in a detailed manner, and especially when 
the data analysis of the press releases was presented. This feature was further enhanced 
by the researcher, when a memo was written during the coding process of the data, to best 
ensure sufficient note-taking of the process. 
The concept of transferability means that the research is tied to earlier research and 
builds on its foundations (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2018, 294). In this research transfera-
bility can be witnessed in the theoretical framework, that is based on a sound theoretical 
background. It also gives examples of research with similar research settings and thus 
builds on its foundation. The methodological choices utilised in this research are also not 
uncommon and have been justified in many occasions, which increases the generalisabil-
ity of the research results of this thesis. 
When evaluating the credibility of a research a few questions would have to be asked. 
Can the gathered data adequately merit the claims of the researcher? Have strong enough 
linkages been made between the observations and the categories? Based on the same set 
of data, could another researcher come to similar results or agree to the findings of this 
study? (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2018, 294.) The sample of 25 press releases used as the 
data in this research can be seen to well live up to the task. All press releases of the topic 
were gathered from the chosen timeframe seen as suitable for a research setting dealing 
with crisis management. Thus, the coverage of the data can be seen as sufficient. Further-
more, the over 200 coded references provided the researcher with adequate data points 
for the analysis and conclusions and a data saturation, where repetitive phenomena were 
achieved. The linkages between the observations and categories have been exemplified 
with numerous quotations from the press releases and further elaborated by the researcher 
with descriptive language in the analysis.  
39 
 
The repeatability and acceptability of the research is dependent on many factors. 
Firstly, the outcomes of the analysis are much dependent on the final classification system 
(Table 3), which would guide any attempts to recreate the study. Hence, its planning and 
base in the chosen theoretical framework is important. Secondly the systematic pro-
cessing of the data and the coding has to be precise and even pedant. To ensure a high 
standard in the coding, the computer program NVivo was utilised. Thirdly, presenting the 
argumentation which lies behind the classification and the analysis gives a reader a clearer 
picture of how the conclusions were drawn. And lastly, a list of all gathered press releases 
is provided combined with a printout of the coded content in the Appendixes. All this 
would provide for a thorough familiarisation of the research and even for a replication. 
However, one cannot argue that this qualitative research and its results would be 
wholly replicable, even though another researcher would have use of exactly the same 
theoretical framework and set of data. A researcher’s interpretations are always, to some 
extent, dependent on fundamental factors that cannot be made equal, and thus the inter-
pretations of the results could, to a varying degree, differ from one another.  
And lastly conformability, which means the researcher’s obligation to use data and 
make interpretations objectively without inflicting the process based on the researchers 
own perspectives or motivations (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2018, 294). As such the author 
has striven for as much neutrality as possible during the research process and described 
the research process in detail to transparently present the made research choices.  
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5 VOLKSWAGEN’S ACTIONS TO REPAIR LEGITIMACY  
The coding of the data plays a crucial role when answering the research question on how 
Volkswagen tried to repair its legitimacy after the emissions scandal. A rigorous classifi-
cation process was conducted to be able to reliably find answers from the data. The find-
ings could then be presented as frequencies and as qualitative results. 
5.1 Classification process 
The first step to achieve a systematic coding was to read through the press releases. Then, 
based on the initial classification system (Table 2) outlined in the theoretical framework 
codes were assigning to the content. Early on during the coding a lot of significant content 
was identified, that did not fit into the initial classification system. To fix this all the extra 
material was gathered into an “extra” category that did not yet have a selected name. After 
having analysed a few documents a trend could be recognised among the extra codes and 
thus the classification system was developed further by adding new categories. Simulta-
neously, explanations on the identified codes were written, so that a systematic coding 
would be easier to maintain. This classification system and the classification guidelines 
are presented in Table 3. As a hermeneutic spiral the classification system grew more 
specific when more data was analysed, and more common patterns were identified. After 
the first round of analysing and coding, all of the coupled codes were reread and some 
content was recoded into new codes or erased altogether, if they did not fit into the clas-
sification.  
When writing this section and reviewing the coded content for a last time, some coded 
content was still transferred, for example to make the division between “review practices” 
and “reconfigure” clear. Thus, a few references were recoded. “Scaling back complexity 
in Volkswagen” was re-coded to reconfiguration instead of review practices, as it inter-
nally contains a structural reform, not just a change in behaviour, and thus fits better to 
that category. 
A lot of though was given to the unit of analysis at this stage: how much content 
(words) could be defined as one coded unit? Sometimes a few words were enough but 
sometimes a longer paragraph was needed to explain the content. A leading thought on 
this matter was to code in a such way, that the content of the code would be easy for an 
outside spectator to recognise. Thus, the length of a code was not considered as important 
as the content and therefore the length of individual codes vary highly. The coding fre-
quency for similar information in the same source document was also reflected on by the 
researcher. If for example a press release included a list of many replaced unit managers, 
those were given the same code, but if the content changed significantly to for example 
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one unit manager and one brand manager, then the content was coded with two codes. It 
did not matter that the coded material represented the same category. 
The analysed data includes all press releases that relate to Volkswagen’s diesel scandal 
revealed during the year 2015. With a total amount of 201 codes assigned to the data, it 
was possible to identify 11 thematic categories describing the ways in which Volkswagen 
tried to repair its legitimacy. Three of these categories were previously not identified in 
literature, but solely found in the data set. Table 4 shows the themes, code categories and 
an explanation of Volkswagen’s actions. In the following sections the argumentation for 
all categories will be presented and explained more thoroughly.   
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Table 4 Explanation of legitimacy repairing actions used by Volkswagen 
Theme  Category/Code  Explanation  
P
ra
g
m
a
ti
c 
 l
eg
it
im
a
cy
 Deny 
Volkswagen denies partially some aspects of the 
crisis or its scale. 
Create monitors 
Collaborating with other actors in connection to 
the crisis helps to ease the pressure on 
Volkswagen. 
Inform customers 
Volkswagen tries to ease customers’ concerns, so 
as not to lose its customer base.  
M
o
ra
l 
le
g
it
im
a
cy
 
Excuse 
Volkswagen excuses for the incident in different 
ways. 
Justify 
Volkswagen tries to alternate the public’s concep-
tion of the scandal into a neutral story. 
Replace personnel 
By replacing the top management of Volkswagen 
and all employees found guilty to any illegal pro-
ceedings Volkswagen disassociates from the cri-
sis. 
Revise practices 
To make similar events impossible in the future 
Volkswagen revises practices. 
Reconfigure 
Volkswagen reconfigures its business processes 
and structure to avoid complexity in the firm. De-
cisions-making is brought nearer to the produc-
tion. 
Affirmation 
Reassurance of a better future and change in the 
company is seen as a way to bring back trust from 
stakeholders. 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
 l
eg
it
im
a
cy
 
Explain 
Volkswagen informs the public openly of its 
wrongdoings in connection to the crisis. 
Technical solu-
tions 
Volkswagen presents technical solutions to fix the 
affected vehicles. 
5.2 Frequencies and quantitative results 
Even though the main attention in the analysis is on the qualitative content of the data, 
quantifying the results helps to give an overview of the content of the press releases. 
Presenting code frequencies and percentage shares demonstrates the appearance of dif-
ferent actions Volkswagen utilised in its communication. The results will both be pre-
sented as percentages of all coded actions or as a numerical amount of actions, whichever 
gives a more proper explanation of the phenomena.  
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The different themes present in Volkswagen’s crisis communication were moral legit-
imacy management, pragmatic legitimacy management and cognitive legitimacy man-
agement. Their shares and the shares of the individual categories are presented in Figure 
4. The three themes are presented with lightly dotted pattern fill, whereas the shares of 
the 11 categories are presented with solid fill.   
 Moral legitimacy management was clearly the most frequently used theme, with 100 
(50%) of VW’s actions falling into this group. Pragmatic legitimacy management ac-
counted for 71 (35 %) assigned codes and cognitive legitimacy management comprised 
only of 30 (15 %) coded actions.  
 
Figure 4 Percentage share of thematical and category frequency in data sample 
The result can partly be explained by the sheer number of categories included in the moral 
legitimacy theme: “excuse”, “justify”, “replace personnel”, “revise practices”, “reconfig-
ure” and “affirmation”. Pragmatic legitimacy only includes the numbers of “deny”, “cre-
ate monitors” and “inform customers” and cognitive legitimacy includes just two catego-
ries: “explain” and “technical solutions”. However, even though the legitimacy manage-
ment themes defined in this thesis are not static, but rather dynamic, it must be recognised 
that moral legitimacy management actions were as often used by Volkswagen as the two 
other themes together. 
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Figure 4 shows clearly, that some actions have appeared more frequently in 
Volkswagen’s communication than others, and that one category did not even appear once 
in the sample. The action of “affirmation” was identified in all together 43 of the 201 
legitimacy management actions (21%), whereas “excuse” only accounted for 6 actions 
(3%). “Create monitors” with 33 actions (16%) and “reconfigure” with 25 actions (12%) 
also stand out from the data.  
As the frequency for some of the actions are clearly higher, more attention will be 
given to these categories as they seem to be more significant, at least from a quantitative 
perspective and as there is more data about them. The categories “affirmation”, “inform 
customers”, and “technical solutions” will be looked into with care as they are categories 
not previously defined by Suchman (1995) as legitimacy management actions but were 
identified as ways for Volkswagen to repair legitimacy by the author. The following sub-
chapters will present these categories in the same order as they were in the classification 
system (Table 3). 
The prevalence of each category in the press releases is presented in Figure 5. The 
percentage share indicates in how big a share of the 25 press releases each action type 
was present.  
 
Figure 5 Percentage share of categories in press releases 
The results presented in Figure 5 are to a large extent similar as the statistics presented in 
Figure 4. For example, the categories “affirmation” and “deny” can be found with high 
percentage shares in both figures. However, some conclusions can be drawn of the few 
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significant differences in the figures. Although “create monitors” was a rather common 
action, with the second largest share of all actions its occurrence in the press releases is 
disproportionally larger than any of the other categories. Being present in 19 (76 %) press 
releases identifies this action to have been often and heavily used by Volkswagen. An-
other conclusion can be made of the category reconfiguration. It had the third largest share 
among the actions, but the category was only present in 5 (20 %) press releases. This 
indicates that the category was seldom present in Volkswagen’s communication, but in 
the few press releases where it was used it had a high frequency.  
The classification process and the findings found through it helps in the analysis of the 
development of Volkswagen’s legitimacy repairing actions over time. In the evaluation 
of the different time phases of the legitimacy management one has to take into account 
that most of the actions were found in press releases released in the beginning of the crisis. 
102 of the altogether 201 references were found in the press releases released during the 
first 17 days, even though the follow-up period was over three months long. This com-
bined with the clear descent in volume of press releases after the first month (Figure 1) 
shows how concentrated the communication was on the initial phase of the crisis. In ad-
dition, as VW’s legitimacy management is studied through its communication one must 
keep in mind that the firm used rhetoric means in its press releases. Such rhetoric tech-
niques are for example repetition of important actions that Volkswagen wanted to high-
light. Extensive use of repetition has a major effect on the quantified results and would 
leave other less frequent findings in the shadow. However, a clear story of development 
can be discovered from the content and meaning of Volkswagen’s actions, which cannot 
be seen in just the quantified findings. When analysing the content and meaning of the 
individual actions the context in which they were released and combination to other ac-
tions play a crucial role. These factors are all part of VW’s legitimacy management strat-
egy, with which it strived to repair its legitimacy. 
Another aspect in Volkswagen’s legitimacy management strategy, that cannot just be 
quantified is the targeting of stakeholder groups with different legitimacy repairing ac-
tions. Some of the actions were clearly meant for individual stakeholder groups, whereas 
others were more general. To be able to analyse the development of Volkswagen’s actions 
and the targeting of individual stakeholder groups VW’s legitimacy management story 
had to be rephrased and summarised. This reframing of VW’s story is presented in section 
5.6. 
5.3 Pragmatic legitimacy 
The combining factor for all of Volkswagen’s actions that were coded into the categories 
of pragmatic legitimacy is the self-interest of the audiences. It could be through actions 
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that were aimed at directly appealing to the vehicle owners’ self-interest, as in the case of 
the new category of “inform customers”. It could also be through more implied and indi-
rect actions, such as with the category of creating monitors, where Volkswagen strived to 
collaborate and act in uniform with organisations of high acceptability. That would ensure 
Volkswagen’s stakeholders to more easily consider Volkswagen’s future actions to be 
aligned with theirs.  
5.3.1 Deny 
Faced with grave and undisputed evidence of emissions cheating, Volkswagen acknowl-
edged to its guilt straight from the beginning of the scandal, and never denied completely 
its involvement in the illegal actions. However, Volkswagen used several other ways to 
implicitly deny (20 references, 10%) or downsize its responsibility for the illegalities. 
Martin Winterkorn, CEO at the time, denied all knowledge of the cheating.  
 
I am doing this in the interests of the company even though I am not aware 
of any wrong doing on my part. (4:1) 
 
The same message was continued also after the change of CEO, when Volkswagen 
blamed individual “rogue engineers” of installing and handling the cheat devices. Even 
though admitting that Volkswagen employees were guilty, the firm denied further 
knowledge of the cheating and the involvement of its management in the decision-making 
about it. 
 
The test manipulations are a moral and political disaster for Volkswagen. 
The unlawful behavior of engineers and technicians involved in engine de-
velopment shocked Volkswagen just as much as it shocked the public. (7:1) 
 
Another way Volkswagen responded was by revoking parts of the claims that were di-
rected against the company. For example, by pointing out that some of its vehicles did 
not have the cheat device installed the company could deny parts of the accusations 
against it.  
 
New vehicles from the Volkswagen Group with EU 6 diesel engines cur-
rently available in the European Union comply with legal requirements 
and environmental standards. (2:1) 
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When confessing to the cheating the company made some ground rules on how far it went 
in the cheating. As the company admitted having cheated regulators and customers, it 
simultaneously strongly denied that this would not have jeopardised the safety of the cus-
tomers.  
 
The software in question does not affect handling, consumption or emis-
sions. (2:2) 
 
The Group CEO also emphasized that all of the vehicles in question are 
technically safe and roadworthy: “At no time was the safety of our cus-
tomers compromised.” (12:1) 
5.3.2 Create monitors 
Creating monitors (33 references, 16%) refers to the actions of Volkswagen with which 
it strived to find institutions that could lend support to it, or institutions Volkswagen could 
use as a source of legitimacy. As such sources Volkswagen utilised legislators, regulators 
and other governmental bodies, that represented trustworthiness, credibility, and other 
positive aspects.  
After having got caught for cheating its customers and regulators alike with a cheating 
device for nearly a decade, Volkswagen must have understood that there was a major 
probability that its messages would not be believed by its stakeholders anymore.  As a 
solution Volkswagen shored up its communication with references to the above-men-
tioned public officials.  
 
We will cooperate fully with the responsible agencies, with transparency 
and urgency, to clearly, openly, and completely establish all of the facts of 
this case. (1:1) 
 
The company will shortly be presenting the technical solutions to the re-
sponsible authorities – in particular the German Federal Motor Transport 
Authority (KBA) – for approval. (12:1) 
 
Today’s meeting showed once again that the investigations are being pur-
sued systematically and intensively. The law firm Jones Day commissioned 
by the Supervisory Board to conduct the external investigation is literally 
leaving no stone unturned. (13:1) 
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All three of the statements above share the same feature of a supporting external actor 
that partly shields Volkswagen from acting alone. As VW either collaborates with some-
one, asks for someone’s approval or opens its books and files for someone to inspect, it 
is hard to give independent critique to Volkswagen directly. The firm hardly seemed to 
do any important decisions without mentioning the external law firm or a responsible 
authority.  
Clearly any sort of self-evaluation after the scandal would have been unthinkable and 
inadequate, but Volkswagen’s choice to order an external investigation was a bold move 
by the company, which, however, also supports Volkswagen’s official message of disbe-
lief when faced with the news of the scandal. The company strongly communicated its 
will to conduct a proper investigation and come clean of the incident. This attitude was 
seen starting from the beginning of the crisis, when Volkswagen voluntarily made a com-
plaint of its own behaviour to the State Prosecutor. Although Volkswagen would certainly 
have met legal proceedings in Germany anyway, acting self in advance gave the company 
more leeway. By being proactive Volkswagen strived to change its profile from being 
chased by the law to a collaborator, with the same goal as the prosecutors. 
 
The Executive Committee have decided that the company will voluntarily 
submit a complaint to the State Prosecutors’ office in Brunswick. In the 
view of the Executive Committee criminal proceedings may be relevant 
due to the irregularities… (5:1) 
 
Another, more subtle way for Volkswagen to monitor its public presence and benefit from 
other stakeholder’s legitimacy was by announcing strong collaboration with its employ-
ees in the wake of the scandal.  
 
In our Group, more than 600,000 people work to build the best cars for 
our customers. I would like to say to our employees: I know just how much 
dedication, how much true sincerity you bring to your work day after day. 
Therefore, it would be wrong to cast general suspicion on the honest, hard 
work of 600,000 people because of the mistakes made by only a few. Our 
team simply does not deserve that. (3:2) 
 
The move can be seen to be inside the scope of creating monitors, as the firm now sug-
gests that any retribution that would be directed on Volkswagen will indirectly also hurt 
the employees of the firm. It is one thing to direct feelings of disappointment and boycott 
against a global multinational and another to do the same thing against (figuratively) a 
neighbour. Thus, for a pragmatic spectator the calculation of the firm gets more vivid. It 
49 
 
is not more a question about the rights and wrongs of a faceless company but also a ques-
tion of the hundreds of thousands of employees, and their carriers, salaries, and happiness. 
This would apply at least as long as the whole body of employees are not under suspicion 
of the crime, which is unthinkable in Volkswagen’s situation, as it has several hundred 
thousand employees. Volkswagen leaned on the support of its workforce in many press 
releases and even had the Works Council representative comment the situation (20:2). 
5.3.3 Inform customers 
This new category of informing customers got its name from the simple fact that a major 
share of the content of the category was messages to customers informing them on the 
progress of evaluations and solutions for their cars. Such a category was necessary to 
establish, as those messages were numerous, including 18 references (9%) in seven files, 
which had a quite similar content, targeted on a specific stakeholder group. It was also 
clear that the content belonged to pragmatic legitimacy, as it appealed to the customers’ 
interest in their own cars. 
This messaging strives to have an influence on the pragmatic side of the audience. It 
targets (mostly) just one significant core stakeholder group; Volkswagen’s customers. 
The need to communicate actively to the existing customers is not overseen by 
Volkswagen, as all existing customers are brand ambassadors of sorts and their willing-
ness to remain Volkswagen customers in the future is of great value for the firm. As such 
the group’s satisfaction with the process of repairing the flawed vehicles is of outmost 
importance for Volkswagen.  
Even though it can be argued that everyone lost something because of Volkswagen’s 
fraud, in the form of passive exposure to higher emissions and local air pollution, the ones 
(economically) most impacted were the existing owners of Volkswagen’s vehicles. As 
Volkswagen was facing a possible threat of restrictions to their vehicle trading, such ver-
dicts would certainly have inflicted the retail value of older diesel vehicles as well. If 
customers would have been left in the dark without proper information the situation could 
have led to existing owners’ panic and mass sell-off. 
 
In a first step, the customers affected will be informed that the emissions 
characteristics of their vehicles will be corrected in the near future. (10:1) 
 
Müller said: “In many instances a software update will be sufficient. Some 
vehicles, however, will also require hardware modifications. We will keep 
our customers constantly informed about the measures and arrange work-
shop appointments.” (12:2) 
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The category of informing customers is a bit similar as “affirmation”, but in this category 
the messages always include some sort of solution and the target group is in the centre of 
the message. The content of the messages is also always reassuring for the target group, 
which suggests they appeal to the self-interest of the customers. 
 
The Volkswagen Group is in addition already in dialogue with the respec-
tive countries' financial and fiscal authorities so that all taxes arising in 
direct relation to the CO2 issue are charged straight to the Volkswagen 
Group and not to the customers. (21:2) 
 
While the technical measures are being performed Volkswagen AG aims 
to avoid any disadvantages for the customers, such as any curbing of their 
mobility. In this connection the Volkswagen brand is assuring all custom-
ers that where necessary an appropriate replacement mobility option will 
be provided free of charge. (25:3) 
 
This category is a good example on how targeted the actions and communication of 
Volkswagen was in its attempt to find a new beginning with each particular stakeholder 
segment.  
5.4 Moral legitimacy 
When Volkswagen’s actions are analysed from a moral legitimacy perspective the utili-
tarian aspect is essential. All categories of moral legitimacy can be seen to give utilitarian 
responses to Volkswagen’s crisis. Volkswagen’s actions in these categories should be 
socially accepted and valuable in themselves. 
5.4.1 Excuse 
To offer an excuse after having wronged someone can be seen as a natural thing to do, 
but for companies this is not as straightforward. Even though the press from the public 
for an apology is strong, the firm might need to consider an apology. This usually includes 
the reason for the apology, which could mean that the company would prematurely con-
fess to a crime for which it might not be judged. However, as Volkswagen was caught 
red-handed and the authorities already had the sufficient proof of emissions tampering, 
the firm did not need to consider holding back the truth. With its communication 
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Volkswagen could take part in the discussion of the scandal, and at least try to repair some 
legitimacy at the same time, by giving an honest apology and excusing (6 references, 3%) 
for its deeds. 
 
We can only apologize and ask our customers, the public, the authorities 
and our investors to give us a chance to make amends. (7:3) 
 
The excuse is also not content bound – when Volkswagen communicates its excuse it 
does not always have to concern the action of installing a cheat device into its vehicles, 
but it can as well be about how the company could not provide the public with sufficient 
information about the crisis even weeks after its initiation. The apology could also be 
given in many ways, one way to frame it was through a negation, as in the examples 
below.  
 
There is absolutely no excuse for the manipulations which have deeply 
shocked Volkswagen. (7:1) 
 
He said that what had happened went against everything the Group and 
its people stand for and that there was no excuse. (12:1) 
 
The “excuse” can also be utilised to disassociate from the previous behaviour: the com-
pany communicates that it is “shocked” and that the actions went against everything the 
company represented (7:1; 12:1).  Furthermore, Volkswagen was clearly striving for 
transparency and accountability in its excuses, as no examples of excuses in the form of 
“we apologise, but actually it was not our fault” were found in the press releases. 
5.4.2 Justify 
The action of justification was not used by Volkswagen in its crisis management. As out-
lined in the theoretical framework, this action is a possible way for repairing legitimacy, 
but the firm had clearly decided against using this method. In the theoretical framework 
it was defined as actions, that strived to change the purpose and actions of the firm retro-
spectively, so that the disruptive action would appear constant with prevailing moral and 
cognitive beliefs. This was perhaps seen as impossible, as the extent of the scandal was 
so large and the contrast between accepted and unaccepted behaviour in this field so wide.  
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5.4.3 Replace personnel 
Among Volkswagen’s first actions after the outbreak of the scandal was Volkswagen’s 
CEO’s, Martin Winterkorn’s voluntary resignation. The decision was published as a state-
ment by the CEO on the third day and as the fourth press release during the crisis. 
 
As CEO I accept responsibility for the irregularities that have been found 
in diesel engines and have therefore requested the Supervisory Board to 
agree on terminating my function as CEO of the Volkswagen Group. (4:1) 
 
Even though the first example is a direct quotation from the CEO, and not presented as 
the company’s message it must be seen to be part of Volkswagen’s crisis communication. 
The firm’s CEO represents the firm in all his actions and the message was published by 
Volkswagen. If the decision to resign was really Martin Winterkorn’s own or if the Su-
pervisory Board had instructed him to frame it as a voluntary resignation, cannot be said 
based on the data. However, replacing the CEO as the chief representative for a company 
is one of the main crisis management actions, and as such the end result would have 
probably been the same wherever the decision came from.  
 
Volkswagen needs a fresh start – also in terms of personnel. I am clearing 
the way for this fresh start with my resignation. (4:2) 
 
The second quotation (4:4) explain quite well why replacing personnel (16 references, 
8%) is an important factor for repairing legitimacy. By changing leadership, the firm 
strives to get a new start, with a new chief executive that cannot be blamed for the for-
mer’s errors. If the scandal is strongly connected to the former CEO, then the firm might 
even frame itself innocent to the CEO’s crimes by expelling him. Volkswagen’s Execu-
tive Committee did not follow this path, but instead thanked the CEO for his work and 
praised him for his responsibility towards the company.  
 
The Executive Committee has great respect for Chairman Professor Dr. 
Winterkorn’s offer to resign his position and to ask that his employment 
agreement be terminated. The Executive Committee notes that Professor 
Dr. Winterkorn had no knowledge of the manipulation of emissions data. 
The Executive Committee has tremendous respect for his willingness to 
nevertheless assume responsibility and, in so doing, to send a strong signal 
both internally and externally. (5:1) 
 
53 
 
With this approach Volkswagen gains simultaneously the benefit of a fresh start with a 
new CEO but also avoids the guilt associated with a public condemnation of its previous 
CEO. As all firms are to a large extent personified in their leadership Volkswagen’s ap-
proach to praise Winterkorn for his responsibility and high values can be seen as a way 
to frame the company to represent that too. At least as long as the guiltiness of Winterkorn 
is undecided and as such the decision to disassociate from the CEO gives the firm more 
time to prepare for next actions. 
After the resignation of the former CEO Volkswagen continued hastily with new lead-
ership changes, by appointing a new CEO, Matthias Müller (then CEO of Porsche, one 
of Volkswagen’s subsidiaries) and a new Chairman for the Supervisory Board, Hans Di-
eter Pötsch4. 
 
4. Matthias Müller will lead the Volkswagen Group going forward as the 
new CEO of Volkswagen AG. He is what the company needs now. Matthias 
Müller is exactly the right man at the right time to make a fresh start and 
to drive clarification of the current crisis that has hit our company with 
decisiveness and to draw the right conclusions. We expressly value his 
critical and constructive approach. (7:2) 
 
The thematic of personnel replacements continued throughout the whole first quarter year 
after the start of the crisis, until a large share of the whole leadership had been changed.  
 
The renewal of personnel in the Group has recently again been given new 
impetus. Since the beginning of 2015, the Group’s Board of Management 
has seen six new members join, seven of the brands have had their top 
personnel changed, and eight departments falling within the CEO’s area 
of responsibility now have new heads. Müller stated: “The team with 
which we wish to address the challenges of the coming months and years 
is in place.” (24:3) 
 
Simultaneously with new appointments Volkswagen reacted strongly against all identi-
fied wrongdoers in the company by suspending their contracts. These actions did also 
continue throughout the whole following period and were brought to the public’s 
knowledge as internal investigations advanced, as can be seen in the 7th, 17th, and 24th 
press release below. 
 
                                                 
4 As the managers and even the top executives of VW are not public figures or well-known persons in the 
same extent as the CEO and Chairman, they are not presented and referred to in this thesis, even though 
they might be named in the public legal proceedings against Volkswagen. 
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With the information currently available the Supervisory Board recom-
mended the immediate suspension of some employees. This process is al-
ready underway. (7:1) 
 
According to Müller, those responsible for what has happened must face 
severe consequences. (17:1) 
 
Hans Dieter Pötsch stressed that, “No business transaction justifies over-
stepping legal and ethical bounds.” As a first step, nine managers who 
may have been involved in the manipulations were suspended. (24:1) 
 
By replacing the top management of Volkswagen and all employees found guilty to any 
illegal proceedings Volkswagen disassociates from the crimes. Disassociation from the 
past is strongly connected to this group of Volkswagen’s actions, and in contrast to some 
other legitimacy actions personnel replacements are concreate actions with concreate out-
comes.  
5.4.4 Revise practices 
The actions categorised under “revise practices” (10 references, 5%) refers to such 
changed practices, that would not need structural changes, as the ones categorised under 
reconfiguration. Such actions can mainly be divided into two groups. Firstly, the practical 
changes, that would prevent further emissions cheating to happen in the company and 
secondly, such cultural changes, that would change the moral code inside the company to 
oppose further illegalities. Both changes would increase trust in Volkswagen’s legal op-
erations. 
Introducing more peer-control to its manufacturing processes is one key feature. This 
is to be done by working in pairs when working with sensitive emissions control devices. 
Other aspects were increased automated supervision, that would both control against and 
alarm in case of illegalities.  
 
...For example, in the future, software for engine control devices will be 
developed more strictly in accordance with the 4-eyes principle… (24:1) 
 
…Volkswagen will introduce IT systems that allow individual processes to 
be monitored with greater efficiency and transparency. This will simulta-
neously reduce our dependence on individuals when problematic pro-
cesses have to be identified and, if necessary, escalated… (24:3) 
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As the company had been able to circumvent the emissions tests of the regulators for 
nearly a decade, a clear alternation to new testing practices was needed. That would in-
clude both increased internal as external testing and also testing in real-world circum-
stances. 
 
…Volkswagen has decided that in the future emissions test will be evalu-
ated externally and independently. In addition, randomly selected real-life 
tests to assess emissions behavior on the road will be introduced. (24:4) 
 
The other thematic, that the firm emphasised after the scandal was cultural change. The 
company CEO remarked, that changes were necessary in management behaviour and in 
the handling of mistakes. The traditional vehicle manufacturer would also need to remake 
itself as something of a combination of its past as a conventional German manufacturer 
and as an agile start-up from California, and thus ensure its fit for future challenges.  
 
According to Müller, the future will be about more open discussions, 
closer cooperation, and a willingness to allow mistakes if they are under-
stood as an opportunity to learn. The Chairman of the Board of Manage-
ment stated, “... I am calling for people who are curious, independent, and 
pioneering. People who follow their instincts and are not merely guided 
by the possible consequences of impending failure. In short: the future at 
Volkswagen belongs to the bold. We need a little more Silicon Valley, cou-
pled with the competence from Wolfsburg, Ingolstadt, Stuttgart, and the 
other Group locations.” (24:6) 
 
The need for change in the company culture may partly be a sign of universal need for 
businesses to change when threatened by new innovations and changes in their operating 
environment, i.e. traditional vehicle manufacturers with the upcoming of electric vehicles 
and new stricter regulation. But in the case of Volkswagen it was also a proclamation of 
change from being a traditional German engineer-led manufacturer to something else. 
5.4.5 Reconfigure 
One of Volkswagen’s most numerous actions was reconfiguration of business practices. 
The category of reconfiguration included actions ranging from geographical and struc-
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tural reorganisation and strategic new orientation. Distinctive for the reconfiguration ac-
tions was that all of the 25 actions (12%) were found in only five press releases. This 
means that the frequency of actions was fairly high in a few press releases.  
Quite early on, just five days in to the emissions crisis, Volkswagen announced wide 
ranging reorganisation of its businesses. Structural changes were especially made in 
North-America, which at the beginning was the centre of crisis. However, further on the 
whole company went on to see major changes in its structure. 
 
The Supervisory Board decided on the reorganization of the Group’s ac-
tivities in North America… (9:3) 
 
Volkswagen strived for a new leaner and more efficient structure, were the global 
Volkswagen Group, which headquarters are based in Germany, was not anymore respon-
sible for all managerial decisions alone. Decisions should rather be possible to be made 
on a geographically unified area where individual regions could work more inde-
pendently. By putting the regions in charge of their own markets Volkswagen simultane-
ously demanded higher responsibility from the regions.  
 
The new structure strengthens the brands and regions, gives the Group 
Board of Management the necessary leeway for strategy and steering 
within the company, and lays a focus on the targeted development of fu-
tureoriented fields.” (9:2) 
 
…existing corporate bodies, structures and processes will be streamlined 
at Group level, in particular by strengthening the brands and regional ac-
countability. To that end the Volkswagen brand will introduce a manage-
ment structure with four regions, each led by a local CEO with a direct 
reporting line to the brand Chairman, Herbert Diess. (9:7) 
 
…introduce new structures in the Volkswagen Group. “The key point is 
that Group management will be decentralized to a greater extent in the 
future”, he said, with more independence for the brands and regions. 
(17:1) 
 
With the reduction of the number of independent markets, combined with a new regional 
level of management Volkswagen communicated its will to depend on clearer structures 
that would strengthen the firm’s accountability but simultaneously reduce its complexity, 
and thus avoid shortcomings in local leadership. 
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The interim Supervisory Board Chairman emphasized that “one key point 
is that we are scaling back complexity in the Group.” (9:9) 
 
Another major them of reconfiguration that was identified in the company’s communica-
tion, was how it announced its need for savings. The cost of the emissions scandal was 
not only a loss of legitimacy but also a large financial burden. The fines the company had 
to pay amounted to the double-digits billions, and Volkswagen had to ensure its stake-
holders of its ability to pay.  
 
He added that the company must now respond swiftly: “That is why we 
have initiated a further critical review of all planned investments. Anything 
that is not absolutely necessary will be cancelled or postponed.” (12:1) 
 
And it is why we will be intensifying the efficiency program. To be perfectly 
frank: this will not be a painless process. (12:2) 
 
…We must make massive savings to manage the consequences of this cri-
sis… (12:3) 
 
The last two quotations are not only directed to the shareholders, but seemingly also to 
the employees. The CEO of the company gives a pre-warning, as not only did the com-
pany’s brand suffer of the scandal, but also sales and profitability were at risk, which 
would have a clear negative impact on the employees’ situation in the future.  
As described earlier Volkswagen Group houses many different car brands and a mul-
titude of models under these brands. One of these brands is Phaeton – Volkswagen’s own 
luxury model, which Volkswagen will now turn into an electric vehicle. If the former 
Phaeton represented the best Volkswagen could offer, in the future a zero-emitting elec-
tric vehicle will take that position.  
 
Phaeton redefined – the future is electric … The future generation of the 
Phaeton will once again be the flagship for the brand’s profile over the 
next decade. In light of this, the Board of Management redefined the cur-
rent project… (14:4) 
 
This sort of actions can be seen as a minor reconfiguration, as the vehicle is not yet in 
production, but it does still give a signal of change. It is also highly relevant as a counter 
measure against the emissions scandal, as electric vehicles have much smaller emissions 
than conventional vehicles. The strategic change to introduce more low emitting technol-
ogies into its vehicles was also a recurring message form Volkswagen. 
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…The focus is on plug-in hybrids with an even greater range, high-volume 
electric vehicles with a radius of up to 300 kilometers, a 48-volt power 
supply system (mild hybrid) as well as ever more efficient diesel, petrol 
and CNG concepts. (14:2) 
 
As a clear sign of changes in the company Volkswagen announced in the aftermath of the 
crisis, that it will re-write its strategy to represent the change the firm wanted to accom-
plish.  
 
The Volkswagen CEO announced that the fifth priority will be to transform 
the Group’s Strategy 2018 into a Strategy 2025…According to Müller, the 
point is not to sell 100,000 more or fewer vehicles than a major competitor. 
Instead, the real issue is qualitative growth. (17:3) 
 
The company had previously, before the crisis, boasted how the new clean diesel vehicles 
would increase Volkswagen’s sales in the US and then make it the largest manufacturer 
in the world. Strategic decisions and changes should be seen as reconfiguration if they 
have material and long-term implications for the firm. Volkswagen’s decision to hence-
forth put new qualitative targets in its strategy instead of only striving for a quantitative 
growth in vehicle sales was a such decision. 
5.4.6 Affirmation 
The most numerous of all categories was one that was discovered in the analysis of 
Volkswagen’s press releases and established as a way for the company to repair legiti-
macy among its stakeholders. The category of “affirmation” was created to harbour all 
such communicative messages that aim to convince the reader of the press releases of 
something. A Cambridge dictionary search would bring an explanation of “to state some-
thing as true”, which is applicable to the category as it certainly was Volkswagen’s intent 
with its comments.  
Furthermore, “affirmation” differs from the other categories, as it is not as clearly a 
thematical category, but rather a stylistic category, where all coded content shares the 
same style of communication with a similar ambition. The decision to categorise “affir-
mation” under moral legitimacy can be argued for as the category’s content often strive 
to amplify the messages of the other moral legitimacy categories. The content coded to 
“affirmation” can also be seen to have utilitarian objective.  A common unifying trait 
among the coded content of the category is that it mostly consists of citations from 
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Volkswagen’s top executives, mostly the Group’s CEO Matthias Müller or Hans Dieter 
Pötsch, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen Group.  
The category was present in 14 of the 25 press releases and included 43 references 
(21%), which is ten more than the second largest category “create monitors”. Examples 
of the category consists mostly of strong declarations of change.  
 
We owe that to our customers, our employees and the public. Manipulation 
and Volkswagen – that must never be allowed to happen again. (3:2) 
 
Matthias Müller said: “My most urgent task is to win back trust for the 
Volkswagen Group – by leaving no stone unturned and with maximum 
transparency, as well as drawing the right conclusions from the current 
situation.” (8:1) 
 
Martin Winterkorn: “I am shocked by the events of the past few days. 
Above all, I am stunned that misconduct on such a scale was possible in 
the Volkswagen Group.” (4:1) 
 
Concerning the content of the quotations the most numerous of them was Volkswagen’s 
determination to win back the trust of customers, employees, and the public, which was 
present in 17 of this category’s references. Volkswagen’s writings about regaining trust 
are also very much in-line with Suchman’s (1995) framework on repairing legitimacy. 
 
I assure you that Volkswagen will do everything humanly possible to win 
back the trust of our customers, the dealerships and the public.” (6:3) 
 
The trust of our customers and the public is and continues to be our most 
important asset. (1:2) 
 
To cover the necessary service measures and other efforts to win back the 
trust of our customers, Volkswagen plans to set aside a provision of some 
6.5 billion EUR… (2:3) 
 
Many of the quotations were seasoned with metaphorical assertions, which changed the 
impression of the press releases to more likable and made them easily quotable for e.g. 
news agencies. Sometimes the quotations in the press releases came from speeches, as 
the one below. It was held by CEO Müller to 20.000 employees at the German firm’s 
place of origin, the Wolfsburg plant in Lower Saxony.  
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“Only when everything has been put on the table, when no single stone 
has been left unturned, only then will people begin to trust us again,” Mül-
ler said. (12:6) 
 
The peculiarity of the citation is that it utilises a well-known rhythm of an old Native-
American saying: 
 
When the last tree has been cut down, the last fish caught, the last river 
poisoned, only then will we realize that one cannot eat money (Speake 
2009, 176). 
 
Which makes the usage in a defence speech of a multinational corporation accused of 
fraud and excessive emissions, frankly, quite odd. Yet, one must assume that the clear 
resemblance is unintentional, and the pattern was chosen because of its effectiveness as a 
figure-of-speech.  
The format of using quotations in its press releases gave the Volkswagen management 
a powerful tool to express its vision for the future of the company, in a hope that these 
reassurances would take hold in the audiences’ minds. Such messages set the pace in 
many of the press releases and helped to build up Volkswagen’s public story, which can 
be exemplified below.  
 
In summary, the Chairman of the Board of Management stated: “Although 
the current situation is serious, this company will not be broken by it. We 
have a clear mission: we will create a new, better, and stronger 
Volkswagen. A company that uses its strengths to make the transition to 
the new world of automobiles. A company that now releases new forces, 
and takes better advantage of its huge potential. And, last but not least, a 
company that will be successful over the long term on the basis of strong 
values.” (24:6) 
5.5 Cognitive legitimacy 
Cognitive legitimacy was the theme with the fewest categories and also least coded con-
tent, although it is a powerful source of legitimacy. As cognitive legitimacy is born on 
the subconscious level and not easily influenced, in contrast to pragmatic and moral le-
gitimacy which can be influenced by right timed and directed actions. Volkswagen could 
61 
 
grow its cognitive legitimacy by being understandable and act consistently with stake-
holders’ opinions and values. After the emissions scandal Volkswagen engaged this lack 
of comprehensibility by explaining its actions and the situation in which it was.  
5.5.1 Explain 
After having wronged someone, a normal reaction is to explain the situation. That was 
also the goal of Volkswagen. By sharing information, the company could lessen the need 
for speculation but also be a more active participant in the discussion that understandably 
aroused after each new revelation of Volkswagen’s fraud. As the information would an-
yway be public information, Volkswagen might have decided to better be part of discus-
sion than not.  
Altogether this category comprises of 17 references (8%) in 10 press releases. To keep 
the content of the category in-line a clear understanding of the category’s content was 
needed. Explaining may be used in so many ways that it was necessary to limit the cate-
gory “explain” to describe why the cheating happened, how it happened and to recount 
the latest findings of the scandal – such as information which courts would release. 
 
At present we do not yet have all the answers to all the questions. But we 
are working hard to find out exactly what happened. To do that, we are 
putting everything on the table, as quickly, thoroughly and transparently 
as possible. (3:1) 
 
The information that has been screened to date has largely explained the 
origin and development of the nitrogen oxide issue. It proves not to have 
been a one-time error, but rather a chain of errors that were allowed to 
happen. The starting point was a strategic decision to launch a large-scale 
promotion of diesel vehicles in the United States in 2005. Initially, it 
proved impossible to have the EA 189 engine meet by legal means the 
stricter nitrogen oxide requirements in the United States within the re-
quired timeframe and budget. This led to the incorporation of software that 
adjusted nitrogen oxide emission levels according to whether vehicles 
were on the road or being tested. Later, when an effective technical pro-
cess was available to reduce Nox emissions, it was not employed to the full 
extent possible. On the contrary, the software in question allowed the ex-
haust gas treatment additive “AdBlue” to be injected in variable amounts 
such that the Nox values were particularly low when vehicles were in the 
test bay, but significantly higher when vehicles were on the road. (24:3) 
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As the example above demonstrates, Volkswagen’s explanation was quite thorough and 
in line with the findings that came from the courtrooms and from the research institutes 
researching on the case. Other communication in this category included e.g. announce-
ments of the number of vehicles affected.  
5.5.2 Technical solutions 
“Technical solutions” is also a new category recognised from the material. It offers a 
category for the mechanical and procedural solutions planned and introduced for its ve-
hicles. 
 
…The software of the 2.0 and 1.2 liter TDI will be updated. For the 1.6 
liter TDI, a so-called flow transformer will be used that increases the 
measurement precision and, in combination with redesigned software, will 
optimize injection quantity. (24:1) 
 
It could well have been incorporated into the “explain” category, but that would have 
increased the category’s size and made it even more diverse, which speaks against the 
idea of categorisation. As such the two categories work as well as their own categories. 
A recognisable trait for “technical solutions” was that it gathered codes only from three 
press releases, but with an amount of all together 13 references the occurrence was rather 
concentrated. 
5.6 Time and stakeholder dependent actions 
To be able to determine the development of Volkswagen’s actions over time and the firms 
use of strategic targeting of individual stakeholder groups one must look at the content of 
these individual actions identified and extracted from VW’s press releases. But to under-
stand their significance they must be seen in context. Each legitimacy repairing action is 
always connected to a larger context, a story. This section will reframe the story 
Volkswagen presented after the scandal and thus help to answer the research question.  
The content of the story is not based on mere quantified results but more importantly on 
the found meanings of Volkswagen’s legitimacy repairing actions.  
The first few initial responses communicated how “deeply shocked” (Excuse 7:1) 
Volkswagen was and “stunned that misconduct on such a scale was possible” (Affirma-
tion 4:1). Regardless its shock and surprise VW was from the very beginning ready to 
63 
 
“set aside a provision of some 6.5 billion” (Affirmation 2:3) euros to cover for necessary 
costs, which it announced in its second statement, and that there was “no excuse for the 
manipulations” (Excuse 7:1). VW also announced that it would conduct internal investi-
gations and promised results “as quickly, thoroughly and transparently as possible” (Ex-
plain 3:1). 
During the period, for which Volkswagen was followed, the company strictly held on 
to its claim that the company’s top executives5 had no knowledge of the 10 million defeat 
devices installed in its vehicles but also never denied the firm’s responsibility as a whole. 
The company repeatedly announced its responsibility and apologised for the deceiving 
practices, however, mostly combined with the addition, that the illegalities “went against 
everything the Group…stand for” (Excuse 12:1). Despite the claimed innocence of the 
CEO Martin Winterkorn he soon “clear(d) the way” (Replace personnel 4:2) for a new 
CEO. With a long row of other changes in leadership the firm effectively disassociated 
with the previous leadership that had represented it in the public.  
Even though Volkswagen’s original calculations of fines and penalties were off by a 
factor of 5:1 and approximation of affected vehicles by a factor of 2:1, it had rightly un-
derstood the graveness of crisis. It affirmed that the “test manipulations are a moral and 
political disaster for Volkswagen” (Deny 7:1), which now three years later can definitely 
be verified, as the scandal has regularly kept its place in the news ever since. One of the 
latest major announcements was the 800 million fine Audi received in October 2018 in 
Germany (McGee 2018d). 
After these first initial responses Volkswagen’s legitimacy management strategy 
seems to have been directed towards regaining the trust of its customers and the public, 
which VW defines as its “most important asset” (Affirmation 1:2). The new CEO Mat-
thias Müller went even so far to announce that his “most urgent task is to win back trust 
for the Volkswagen Group” (Affirmation 8:1).  
Volkswagen’s actions for rebuilding trust i.e. repairing legitimacy with different stake-
holders varied a lot. Identified stakeholder groups that Volkswagen especially focused on 
in its crisis communication were its existing and future customers, the authorities and the 
general public i.e. citizens with no affiliation with VW. The legitimacy management ac-
tions associated most directly with each stakeholder group are presented with an expla-
nation in Table 5. However, the stakeholder group division is not strictly unambiguous, 
as the communication can be directed to more than one group at the same time. Even 
though the segments are overlapping it gives a general perspective on the mainly targeted 
                                                 
5 At the time of writing (1/2019) over 70 employees and former employees of Volkswagen are facing trials 
in court or have been sentenced for their deeds regarding the emissions scandal. The sentenced include 
mostly engineers and managers, but among the ones waiting for decisions on their trials are the former 
CEOs Martin Winterkorn and Matthias Müller. (Bender 2018.) Rupert Stadler, former CEO of Audi and 
board member of Volkswagen Group has been arrested for 6 months on suspicion of knowledge of the 
emissions cheating (O’Kane 2018). On the 15th April 2019 the German “prosecutors filed aggravated fraud 
charges against Martin Winterkorn “(Schuetze 2019). 
64 
 
stakeholder group. It is also noteworthy that other legitimacy repairing actions can influ-
ence the stakeholder groups, even though it would not be directly targeted solely at it.  A 
few messages were also directed to the employees of Volkswagen, which of course are 
an important stakeholder group, but mostly not communicated to with press releases. 
There was not enough data to establish a clear picture of Volkswagen’s communication 
towards its employees in its effort to repair the employees trust to the company. 
Table 5 Volkswagen’s medium-term legitimacy management strategy to repair 
legitimacy after the emissions scandal 
Stakeholder 
group 
Explanation 
Legitimacy management  
action 
Government 
Come clean and collaborate with  
authorities 
Create monitors 
Customers 
Ensure customer safety and financial 
security 
Deny 
Inform customers 
General public 
Find the responsible and make them 
pay 
Replace personnel 
 
Volkswagen’s main message for existing customers was that the defeat device did not 
“affect handling, consumption or emissions” (Deny 2:2) and that all vehicles were tech-
nically “safe and roadworthy” (Deny 12:1). For future customers the firm added that its 
newer vehicle models did not have the defeat device and would thus “comply with legal 
specifications and environmental requirements” (Deny 2:1). These measures were aimed 
to regain trust among its customer base, by ensuring safety and security to them. This was 
further bolstered by Volkswagen’s promise that no disadvantage would come to existing 
customers, and that the company would even take care of any extra fees or “taxes arising” 
(Inform customers 21:2) from the emissions issue.  
To ensure the rebuilding of trust towards the authorities, as regulators and officials, 
Volkswagen used other measures. In nearly four out of five of its press releases 
Volkswagen announced its aim to “cooperate fully with responsible agencies, with trans-
parency and urgency” (Create monitors 1:1). If the repetitious communication was out of 
fear for retributions from the regulators or just a sign or token of collaboration for the 
authorities’ lengthy investigations cannot be said, but the message was clearly aimed at 
them.  
A third stakeholder group to which Volkswagen had to rebuild trust to was the general 
public. Such individuals would not be as much interested in the promise of vehicle-safety 
as customers or the need for assurance of collaboration as authorities were. They would 
be more interested in that justice was fulfilled. As Volkswagen was able to frame the 
illegalities in such a way that it was more rogue engineers, than the whole company that 
was to be blamed, directed the interest to finding and ensuring that “those responsible for 
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what has happened (…) face severe consequences” (Replace personnel 17:1). For ordi-
nary citizens, this was not a question of vengeance, but of righteousness, where VW’s 
further announcements of suspending managers who “have been involved in the manip-
ulations” (Replace personnel 24:1) helped Volkswagen to repair legitimacy. 
However, these identified medium-term trust building activities, as important as they 
were, can only be seen to be a patch which helps to ensure that the company’s legitimacy 
would not deteriorate even further. Yes, vehicle owners would be able to trust that 
Volkswagen’s cars are safe and that the they would not be in a financial danger regarding 
their car. But they would most likely still think on Volkswagen as the company that 
tricked them to buy a flawed car. Or the citizens who read about the suspension of crim-
inal employees, would they not remember Volkswagen as the firm that defied the rules, 
even though it later acted to make amends and rectify it. This seems plausible.  
To repair its legitimacy as defined by Suchman (1995) Volkswagen needed real 
change. No mere revised practices as implementing a “4-eyes principle” (Revise practices 
24:1) to its engine control device development or similar actions would be enough to 
make the stakeholders forget that the company had been caught red handed for fraud. As 
any minor changes would not be enough, Volkswagen needed a vision of change that 
would make stakeholders look past VW’s wrongdoings to be able to repair its legitimacy. 
The change Volkswagen decided to pursue was a transformation to become a leading 
provider of electric mobility. From having been the world’s largest producer of traditional 
internal combustion engine vehicles it decided to take the leap into being the first major 
car manufacturer that invested its future in electric vehicles. This transformation would 
of course be a long-term change, but by careful review of the press releases show that this 
change was initiated with Volkswagen’s legitimacy management actions. 
But as with every change there is change resistance and fear for change, which could 
prevent any major transformations. The first step towards changing the course of the firm 
was the changes in management, after which the appointed new leaders could steer the 
company into the new direction. The second came through restructuring, which gave the 
Group Board of Management more “leeway for strategy and steering within the com-
pany” (Reconfigure 9:2), which ensured them more power for strategic changes. To make 
employees better acceptable for the upcoming changes the Board increased anxiety and 
uncertainty among them by announcing that all planned investments would be reviewed 
and “anything that is not absolutely necessary will be cancelled or postponed” (Recon-
figure 12:1). The message was even further enhanced by adding that the efficiency pro-
gram would “not be a painless process” (Reconfigure 12:2) in the CEO’s speech to em-
ployees. 
The major transformation into electric mobility was hinted on already in October 2015, 
with announcements that the Group would shift focus to “plug-in hybrids with an even 
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greater range, high-volume and electric vehicles” (Reconfigure 14:2) and with the recal-
ibration of Volkswagen’s flagship brand, the Volkswagen Phaeton, to an all-electric ve-
hicle (Reconfigure 14:4). 
The CEO described the upcoming change, that would be presented in the company’s 
new strategy “Together 2025” as a “transition to the new world of automobiles” (Affir-
mation 24:6). This change was proven in VW’s new strategy that was released 6 months 
later in June 2016 with the overreaching goal for Volkswagen Group to become the 
world’s leading provider of sustainable mobility. That would mean a surge in production 
of electric vehicles and massive investments to the technology. (VW Strategy 2016.) The-
ses actions of reconfiguration and the presentation of the new strategy with a clear goal 
in reaching sustainability is the defining point in Volkswagen’s strategy to repair its le-
gitimacy. 
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6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The findings of this research are drawn together in this concluding chapter with manage-
rial and theoretical implications. At the end of the chapter future research based on the 
results of this thesis are suggested and the limitations of this research are acknowledged. 
6.1 Key findings 
The classification system based on the legitimacy management framework outlined by 
Suchman (1995) proved adequate for recognising most of Volkswagen’s actions with 
which it tried to repair its legitimacy. The theoretical backbone of this thesis, legitimacy 
theory, can be used for analysing strategic crisis management, because it helps the re-
searcher to explain and predict the patterns found in a firm’s legitimacy management. 
With the addition of the categories of “affirmation”, “technical solutions”, and “inform 
customers” to the classification system the coverage of the analysis could be extended to 
incorporate most of Volkswagen’s actions to repair legitimacy. When evaluating the 
added action categories, one must keep in mind that they are highly situation sensitive 
and possibly applicable only to vehicle manufacturing industry.  
Units of analysis were coded into nearly all the defined categories and most received 
a large amount of content, which means that the category was common. Frequently coded 
categories were especially the categories of “affirmation”, “create monitors”, and “recon-
figure”. The three categories with the least coded content were “technical solutions”, “re-
vise practices”, and “justify”, latter being the only category that received zero references. 
When observing how often the categories were included in VW’s press releases the 
three most common were again “create monitors” and “affirmation” but instead of “re-
configuration” the category “deny” was the third most used in the press releases. Apart 
from “justify” the three categories with least occurrences in press releases were “technical 
solutions”, “revise practices” and “reconfiguration”. When comparing the percentage 
share of each category in the whole data sample to its prevalence among the press re-
leases, especially the category “reconfiguration” is notable. It has quite a modest preva-
lence among the press releases occurring in only five, but has still 25 references coded to 
it. This tells of a large aggregation of reconfiguration actions in each of the five press 
releases. 
When comparing the share between the three thematic groups of moral legitimacy, 
pragmatic legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy the first mentioned was clearly the largest. 
Moral legitimacy received half of all references from the data as pragmatic legitimacy 
accounted for 35 % and cognitive legitimacy for 15 %. It contains also the most com-
monly used category “affirmation”, which was created for this study based on the findings 
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from the data. In contrast to the more thematically grouped other categories “affirmation” 
represents a more stylistic category with which Volkswagen amplified its other messages. 
“Create monitors” was the largest category in the theme pragmatic legitimacy which 
gathered all of Volkswagen’s action with which it tried to use other institutions legitimacy 
as a shield or source of legitimacy. As such the theme was often used by Volkswagen. 
The less frequent theme cognitive legitimacy contained the categories “explain” and 
“technical solutions”. To these categories were coded such content with which 
Volkswagen strived to repair its legitimacy on a subconscious level. Such is hard to ac-
complish, is time consuming, and may therefore have been quite seldom applied to the 
press releases. 
When evaluating Volkswagen’s responses and actions with which it tried to repair its 
legitimacy the interesting aspect is how efficient the chosen actions where. This signifi-
cance of the categories cannot be as easily determined as the amount, share or content. 
But for the analysis, the significance of these determinants is needed. The significance of 
Volkswagen’s actions is based on the content combined with the share and amount of 
each action. It is equally important to recognise that the significance of each action cannot 
be evaluated without the interference and connection to the other actions. As such 
Volkswagen’s crisis management actions are pieces of a larger frame which must be eval-
uated as a whole to understand how Volkswagen strived to repair its legitimacy.  
The decision to further segment Volkswagen’s legitimacy management actions based 
on the targeted stakeholder segment gave a more thorough understanding of how the ac-
tions could be used most effectively. This has further managerial implications, as it proves 
that the choice of legitimacy repairing actions are case sensitive, where the significance 
of each action depends highly on the organisation’s identified stakeholders. Segmenting 
actions based on stakeholders was touched upon and implied by Suchman, but not as 
firmly stated as an important factor in legitimacy repairing process as the earlier defined 
actions. By choosing which stakeholder segments are most important for the organisation 
it can simultaneously narrow down the actions it will need to use in its crisis management. 
For Volkswagen these identified stakeholder groups with the connected actions respec-
tively were the government and “create monitors”, customers combined with “deny” and 
“inform customers” and the general public with “replace personnel”.  
The reframing of Volkswagen’s legitimacy management story showed that individual 
actions worked together to rebuild legitimacy in the most efficient way. More important 
than any of the individual action categories was the collaboration of actions as pieces of 
the larger strategy to repair legitimacy. As such the significance of legitimacy repairing 
actions and communication about them should also be evaluated based on the wholeness 
of the legitimacy management strategy. It is also important to notice that the effective use 
of the actions is also dependent on the timeframe when they are used, and as such different 
legitimacy repairing actions may prevail as the most significant during each phase of the 
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crisis. Based on the findings of this research it can be argued, that the action of reconfig-
uration was defined as the most significant way for Volkswagen to repair its legitimacy 
on the long term.  
6.2 Embracing change and repositioning for the future  
Volkswagen Group’s emissions scandal in year 2015 had large consequences for the firm 
on the short term but especially the longer-term implications for the company have been 
significant. When summing up all the costs inflicted by the defeat device and the emis-
sions cheating Volkswagen has already paid up to 30 billion euros for the scandal that 
affected up to 10 million vehicles. That sum however, includes only the fines and other 
penalties for violations of laws, payments to authorities, costs of compensations, repur-
chases and retrofitting of vehicles. (McGee 2018; Leggett 2018c.) Other costs as e.g. in-
ternal cost of work regarding the investigation, response planning, or increased marketing 
costs are not included in the total sum and external not-as-easily quantifiable costs as 
reputational costs are also notwithstanding but certainly substantial. Furthermore, 
Volkswagen still faces new lawsuits around the world, including a nine billion claim by 
shareholders in Germany (Kottasova 2018). Compared with the sale revenues of nearly 
231 billion and an operating profit of 17 billion euros for the year 2017 the penalties are 
significant, however not life-threatening for the multinational (Volkswagen’s annual re-
port 2018). 
When observing the situation of 2015, and Volkswagen’s initial response to the crisis, 
one must bear in mind that the firm had to make its crisis management strategy in the 
wake of the crisis based on the information the firm had at that point of time, and under 
hard pressure. Thus, an evaluation of VW’s choices over three years later in 2019 can be 
made based on much more information than the firm could know for certain of the future 
in 2015. Yet, one must assume and even take for granted, that Volkswagen had drafted 
future scenarios for its core business, with much more data than the public knew at the 
time. The plans would have been based on investigations of upcoming regulation, con-
sumer reports on future demand, and business plans of future business targets. They are 
usually based on the firm’s own knowledge of its own strengths and weaknesses and the 
threats and possibilities it will face in the future. Such strategic planning is common for 
corporations in the size of Volkswagen and mandatory for future success, especially in 
an industry which is still heavily based on physical manufacturing. Reactions to consumer 
demand that require changes in production cannot be done in a fortnight but can take 
years of planning and production. 
Keeping this in mind one can deduct, that Volkswagen combined this thorough indus-
try-specific knowledge to its legitimacy management strategy. How soon the strategy to 
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overcome the crisis was coined, and how exact the strategy was in the beginning one 
cannot know. What is clear though, is that the company had a strategy and strived to 
create a coherent story of change, which it could use and consistently refer to in its press 
releases.  
The need for change and the need to transform the whole company had certainly been 
recognised at Volkswagen much earlier than 2015. The unquestionable megatrends that 
would threaten the traditional car manufacturing industry had been present for decades. 
Global warming and urbanisation were not questioned anymore, they were regarded as 
facts that would certainly have drastic implications for the greenhouse gas emitting inter-
nal combustion engine and the diesel engine with its local air-quality pollutants in the 
future. Failing to act on these megatrends seems like a folly from the point-of-view of 
2019, but then again – much have changed in the car manufacturing industry since.  
Just to mention a few examples of changes in the business environment. Two large 
German cities, Stuttgart and Hamburg have decided to ban old diesel-vehicles from their 
centrums in a push to clear the air from local air-quality pollutants (Deutsche Welle 2018). 
The Paris Agreement, approved in 2016, aims to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 
degrees Celsius by cutting emissions drastically (Paris Agreement 2018). Sweden and 
Norway have decided to ban selling of new combustion engine vehicles in 2030 respec-
tively 2025 (Hartikainen 2018). Those are just the foretaste of challenges the traditional 
car manufacturers will face in the not-so-far-away future. 
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal was a changing point for VW, that made it possible 
for the firm to pursue a transformation to become a producer of electric vehicles. The 
crisis set things in motion for the manufacturer, first with minor changes and then larger. 
Severe crisis can be catalysts for change, as the organisation is forced to make internal 
changes. The emissions crisis Volkswagen faced in 2015 gave VW’s management the 
possibility to initiate changes that might have previously not have been possible, either 
because of internal opposition or for fear of customer reactions. The situation was evalu-
ated as so grave that the leadership managed to get the company and its stakeholders to 
“buy-in” to the transformation to electric mobility. This long-term reconfiguration of 
Volkswagen’s business is the most significant legitimacy repairing action after the emis-
sions scandal. 
What the company needed after the emissions scandal was a change that would alter 
the future story of Volkswagen so much that the unwanted bond to the emissions cheating 
would be broken. To achieve this change Volkswagen is investing 44 billion euros until 
year 2023 in electric mobility, which is manifold compared with its peers (Murphy 2019). 
This is not to say, that electric vehicles would not have been around before or that other 
companies would not produce them. Yet, based on VW’s new strategy the German firm 
would be the first large scale vehicle manufacturer to invest its future in electric move-
ment.  
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6.3 Theoretical implications 
In this research, the assumption was made that organisations strategically plan their ac-
tions and strive to uphold legitimacy, and as in the situation of Volkswagen the firm will 
attempt to repair its legitimacy in the event of an internal and external crisis. As the main 
framework of this thesis, Suchman’s legitimacy management framework, draws from the 
highly theoretical legitimacy theory, the practical utilisation of the framework must be 
done carefully.  
The actions identified by Suchman (1995) were initially not ranked based on their 
prevalence or significance in the legitimacy management of an organisation. However, 
the findings of this research suggest that significance of each action can be found by an-
alysing the story the organisation wants to present. Only by combining the systematically 
found actions with a thorough analysis of the firm’s strategic objectives can significance 
of each action be evaluated. For this purpose, Volkswagen’s stakeholder segments were 
identified as target groups of legitimacy management. This segmentation made it possible 
to extract information about targeting individual actions for specific stakeholder groups, 
which was not explicitly stated in the original framework presented by Suchman (1995). 
To receive a full coverage of all actions, further categories were added to the classifi-
cation system originating in the theoretical framework. The evidence of this research sug-
gests that additions may well be in place for a successful application of legitimacy man-
agement framework. However, as the naming practice of new categories is arbitrary and 
the content of the categories fully dependent on the event, clear instructions for any en-
largement or specification of Suchman’s framework cannot be given. The theoretical im-
plication would thus be to open the framework for more case sensitive categories, that in 
the best way observe the peculiarity of the legitimacy management situation in question. 
This applies fully to the omission of the “justify” category in the press releases, as it did 
not have a purpose in the chosen legitimacy management strategy of Volkswagen and 
was thus left unused, but the conclusion of this would hence not be that it would not 
deserve its place as a defined legitimacy management action. 
6.4 Limitations and further research 
To understand and state the limitations of one’s own research gives more creditability to 
the research results as their limitations are thus better known. Such defined limitations of 
this thesis where the source, the type, and the one-sidedness of the data. By only analysing 
the press releases of Volkswagen the author was limited to very partial material written 
by Volkswagen. Other formats than press releases could also have been used, for example 
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including other marketing material by Volkswagen would have expanded the understand-
ing on Volkswagen’s legitimacy management strategy further.  
A triangulation of methods would have made it possible to analyse the content in more 
multifaceted ways, which would have increased the trustworthiness of the research. Cod-
ing in content analysis does not in itself put value on the effectiveness of any of the found 
legitimacy repairing actions and so combining content analysis with some other analysis 
method might have given more thorough information about the discovered legitimacy 
repairing actions. 
The theoretical framework is to a large extent based on the writings of one individual 
researcher, Mark Suchman, and as such the theoretical foundation for legitimacy man-
agement can be called to questioned. However, most present research on legitimacy man-
agement are based on the work of Suchman and present him as a seminal writer on the 
theme (see e.g. Grolin 1998; Palazzo & Scherer 2006; Erkama & Vaara 2010; Desai 2011; 
Carnegie & O’Connell 2012; Claasen & Roloff 2012; Dumay et al. 2015).  
The findings of this study offer interesting future possibilities for research. A possible 
future research avenue would be to enlarge the legitimacy management framework to 
utilise segmentation of stakeholders in the analysis. Another future research subject could 
be to dig deeper into Volkswagens legitimacy management by applying a new research 
design to the same research. By collecting more data, for example by broadening the data 
sample to marketing material or Volkswagen’s social media communication (posts on 
Twitter and Facebook) one would receive enough data to be able to analyse how the le-
gitimacy management actions changed during the time period and if the change was de-
pendent on the communication channel. Further studies could also be conducted on other 
firms facing a crisis, perhaps in other industries to find out if the findings for that industry 
would be similar to those concerning Volkswagen. 
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Key words
diesel issue; diesel scandal; co2 issue; co2 scandal; nox scandal; nox issue; diesel crisis; 
defeat device; cheat device; cheating device; emissions scandal; emission scandal; 
emissions issue; emission issue; dieselgate; diesel gate
Release date Name of press release
2015_09_20 Statement of Prof. Dr. Martin Winterkorn, CEO of Volkswagen AG
2015_09_22 Volkswagen AG has issued the following information
2015_09_22 Text: video statement of the CEO of Volkswagen AG 
2015_09_23 Statement by Prof. Dr. Winterkorn 
2015_09_23
Statement from the Executive Committee of Volkswagen 
AG’s Supervisory Board 
2015_09_25
Dr. Herbert Diess, CEO of the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand, explains: 
“We are working at full speed on a solution.” 
2015_09_25 Statement by the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen AG 
2015_09_25 Matthias Müller appointed CEO of the Volkswagen Group 
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The Volkswagen Group is restructuring: Supervisory Board passes resolutions for new 
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Volkswagen AG announces action plan to update diesel vehicles with EA 189 EU5 
engines 
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Statement from the Executive Committee of Volkswagen AG's Supervisory Board 
following its meeting on September 30, 2015 
2015_10_06 Matthias Müller: “We will overcome this crisis” 
2015_10_07 Statement from the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen AG 
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Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA) decides on recall for affected EA 189 diesel 
vehicles 
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2015_10_28 Matthias Müller unveils next steps for the Volkswagen Group 
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Statement on the announcement by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
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Clarification moving forward: internal investigations at Volkswagen identify 
irregularities in CO2 levels 
2015_11_09 Group Board of Management and Works Council agree on joint steps 
2015_11_13 Next step in clarifying the CO2 issue 
2015_11_25
Technical measures for the EA 189 diesel engines affected presented to the German 
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2015_12_09 CO2 issue largely concluded 
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Group realignment 
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APPENDIX 2 EXAMPLE OF PRESS RELEASE 
 
 
 
  
 
Volkswagen AG has issued the following information: 
 
Wolfsburg, September 22, 2015 –Volkswagen is working at full speed to clarify 
irregularities concerning a particular software used in diesel engines. New vehicles 
from the Volkswagen Group with EU 6 diesel engines currently available in the 
European Union comply with legal requirements and environmental standards. The 
software in question does not affect handling, consumption or emissions. This gives 
clarity to customers and dealers. 
Further internal investigations conducted to date have established that the relevant engine 
management software is also installed in other Volkswagen Group vehicles with diesel 
engines. For the majority of these engines the software does not have any effect.  
Discrepancies relate to vehicles with Type EA 189 engines, involving some eleven million 
vehicles worldwide. A noticeable deviation between bench test results and actual road use 
was established solely for this type of engine. Volkswagen is working intensely to eliminate 
these deviations through technical measures. The company is therefore in contact with the 
relevant authorities and the German Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA – 
Kraftfahrtbundesamt).  
 
To cover the necessary service measures and other efforts to win back the trust of our 
customers, Volkswagen plans to set aside a provision of some 6.5 billion EUR recognized in 
the profit and loss statement in the third quarter of the current fiscal year. Due to the ongoing 
investigations the amounts estimated may be subject to revaluation. 
Earnings targets for the Group for 2015 will be adjusted accordingly. 
 
Volkswagen does not tolerate any kind of violation of laws whatsoever. It is and remains the 
top priority of the Board of Management to win back lost trust and to avert damage to our 
customers. The Group will inform the public on the further progress of the investigations 
constantly and transparently. 
 
 
Volkswagen Group Communications 
Head of Corporate & Business Communications 
Andreas Lampersbach 
Phone: +49 (0) 53 61 / 9-3 93 56 
E-Mail:  andreas.lampersbach@volkswagen.de 
www.volkswagen-media-services.com 
www.volkswagenag.com 
 
No. 346/2015 
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APPENDIX 3  CODED CONTENT 
DENY 
2015_09_22_Press_Release_2 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
New vehicles from the Volkswagen Group with EU 6 diesel 
engines currently available in the European Union comply 
with legal requirements and environmental standards. 
Reference 2  
The software in question does not affect handling, consump-
tion or emissions. 
Reference 3  
Further internal investigations conducted to date have estab-
lished that the relevant engine management software is also 
installed in other Volkswagen Group vehicles with diesel en-
gines. For the majority of these engines the software does not 
have any effect. 
2015_09_23_Press_Release_4 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1  
I am doing this in the interests of the company even though I 
am not aware of any wrong doing on my part. 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_6 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
As previously announced, all new Volkswagen Passenger Car 
brand vehicles that fulfill the EU6 norm valid throughout Eu-
rope are not affected. This therefore also includes the current 
Golf, Passat and Touran models. 
Reference 2  
The vehicles are and remain technically safe and roadworthy. 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_7 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
“The test manipulations are a moral and political disaster for 
Volkswagen. The unlawful behavior of engineers and techni-
cians involved in engine development shocked Volkswagen 
just as much as it shocked the public. 
2015_09_29_Press_Release_10 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
All vehicles are technically safe and roadworthy. 
2015_10_06_Press_Release_12 - 2 references coded 
Reference 1  
The Group CEO also emphasized that all of the vehicles in 
question are technically safe and roadworthy: “At no time 
was the safety of our customers compromised. 
Reference 2  
And above all: all EU6 diesel vehicles comply with legal 
specifications and environmental requirements. 
2015_10_15_Press_Release_15 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
Customers now have clarity with regard to the continued un-
restricted use of the vehicles. All of the vehicles affected re-
main technically safe and roadworthy. 
Reference 2  
The current successor generation of EA 288 diesel engines 
(in use since 2012) is not affected. 
2015_10_22_Press_Release_16 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
Volkswagen confirms today that no software constituting an 
improper defeat device as defined in law is installed in vehi-
cles with EA 288 EU5 as well as EU6-engines in the Euro-
pean Union. Consequently, new vehicles of the Volkswagen 
Group offered within the European Union with those engines 
comply with legal requirements and environmental standards. 
2015_11_02_Press_Release_18 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
Statement on the announcement by the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
Wolfsburg, November 2, 2015 – The United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) informed Volkswagen Ak-
tiengesellschaft on Monday that vehicles with V6 TDI en-
gines had a software function which had not been adequately 
described in the application process. Volkswagen AG wishes 
to emphasize that no software has been installed in the 3-liter 
V6 diesel power units to alter emissions characteristics in a 
forbidden manner.  
Volkswagen will cooperate fully with the EPA clarify this 
matter in its entirety. 
2015_11_03_Press_Release_19 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
The safety of the vehicles is in no way compromised. 
2015_11_13_Press_Release_21 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1  
What is sure is that the vehicles’ safety is definitely not af-
fected and there is therefore no need for any technical 
measures to be taken 
2015_11_25_Press_Release_22 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
One thing is certain: the vehicles remain technically safe and 
can therefore be driven on public roads without any limita-
tion. 
2015_12_09_Press_Release_23 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
Just a month after questions relating to the CO2 figures meas-
ured on some of the Group’s models arose, Volkswagen has 
largely concluded the clarification of the matter. Following 
extensive internal investigations and measurement checks, it 
is now clear that almost all of these model variants do corre-
spond to the CO2 figures originally determined. This means 
that these vehicles can be marketed and sold without any lim-
itations. The suspicion that the fuel consumption figures of 
current production vehicles had been unlawfully changed was 
not confirmed. During internal remeasurements slight devia-
tions were found on just nine model variants of the 
Volkswagen brand. 
Reference 2  
Volkswagen presented these results to the investigation com-
mission of the Federal Government and the Federal Motor 
Transport Authority (KBA). The figure of approximately 
800,000 vehicles under suspicion originally published by the 
Volkswagen Group has not been confirmed. The deviations 
found in the figures for only nine model variants amount to a 
few grams of CO2 on average, corresponding to increased cy-
cle consumption in the NEDC of approximately 0.1 to 0.2 li-
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tres per 100 kilometres. With an annual production of approx-
imately 36,000 vehicles, these model variants correspond to 
around only 0.5 per cent of the volume of the Volkswagen 
brand. The list of the nine model variants can be found at 
www.volkswagenmedia-services.com. 
Reference 3  
Customers’ real-world consumption figures do not change 
and neither are any technical vehicle modifications necessary 
 
 
 
CREATE MONITORS 
2015_09_20_Press_Release_1 -2 references coded  
Reference 1  
We will cooperate fully with the responsible agencies, with 
transparency and urgency, to clearly, openly, and completely 
establish all of the facts of this case. 
Reference 2  
Volkswagen has ordered an external investigation of this mat-
ter. 
2015_09_22_Press_Release_2 -1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
The company is therefore in contact with the relevant author-
ities and the German Federal Motor Transport Authority 
(KBA – Kraftfahrtbundesamt). 
 
2015_09_22_Press_Release_3 - 2 references coded 
Reference 1 
And we continue to cooperate closely with the relevant  
government organizations and authorities 
Reference 2 
In our Group, more than 600,000 people work to build the 
best cars for our customers. I would like to say to our employ-
ees: I know just how much dedication, how much true sincer-
ity you bring to your work day after day. Therefore, it would 
be wrong to cast general suspicion on the honest, hard work 
of 600,000 people because of the mistakes made by only a 
few. Our team simply does not deserve that. 
2015_09_23_Press_Release_5 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1 
6. The Executive Committee have decided that the company 
will voluntarily submit a complaint to the State Prosecutors’ 
office in Brunswick. In the view of the Executive Committee 
criminal proceedings may be relevant due to the irregularities. 
The investigations of the State Prosecutor will be supported 
in all form from the side of Volkswagen. 
Reference 2  
7. The Executive Committee proposes that the Supervisory 
Board of Volkswagen AG create a special committee, under 
whose leadership further clarifying steps will follow, includ-
ing the preparation of the necessary consequences. In this re-
gard, the Special Committee would make use of external ad-
vice. 
Reference 3  
9. The Executive Committee will work on these tasks to-
gether with the employees and the Management Board. 
Volkswagen is a magnificent company that depends on the 
efforts of hundreds of thousands of people. 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_6 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
We are working intensively on remedial measures in close 
coordination with the certification authorities. 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_7 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
1. The Supervisory Board has authorized the Chairman to 
mandate German and US lawyers to objectively investigate 
and fully clarify the manipulation of emissions data of diesel 
engines. 
Reference 2  
” The Supervisory Board today commissioned an American 
law firm to assist in further clarification and in preparing the 
necessary steps. 
2015_09_29_Press_Release_10 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
Under the action plan, Volkswagen and the other Group 
brands whose vehicles are affected will present the technical 
solutions and measures to the responsible authorities in Octo-
ber. 
2015_10_01_Press_Release_11 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
Under the guidance of the Supervisory Board, the external in-
vestigation is being conducted by the US law firm Jones Day. 
This complex and comprehensive investigation will cover all 
the current relevant matters. The Supervisory Board will en-
sure that the law firm can carry out its investigation inde-
pendently. Jones Day will submit regular reports to the Su-
pervisory Board on progress with the investigation. 
Reference 2  
In addition to Jones Day, the committee will be able to call 
upon additional external consultants and experts at any time. 
2015_10_06_Press_Release_12 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
The company will shortly be presenting the technical solu-
tions to the responsible authorities – in particular the German 
Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA) – for approval. 
2015_10_07_Press_Release_13 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
The new Supervisory Board Chairman continued: “Today’s 
meeting showed once again that the investigations are being 
pursued systematically and intensively. The law firm Jones 
Day commissioned by the Supervisory Board to conduct the 
external investigation is literally leaving no stone unturned.” 
2015_10_15_Press_Release_15 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
Wolfsburg, October 15, 2015. Volkswagen welcomes the 
swift decision by the Federal Motor Transport Authority 
(KBA) to implement the timetable and plan of measures sub-
mitted last week by issuing a recall. This decision gives cus-
tomers clarity with regard to the continued unrestricted use of 
the vehicles. 
Reference 2  
All measures will first be presented to the responsible author-
ities. 
2015_10_28_Press_Release_17 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
For this purpose, audit firm Deloitte has been engaged in ad-
dition to the steps already announced. According to Müller, 
those responsible for what has happened must face severe 
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consequences. 
2015_11_03_Press_Release_19 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
The Board of Management of Volkswagen AG will immedi-
ately start a dialog with the responsible type approval agen-
cies regarding the consequences of these findings. This 
should lead to a reliable assessment of the legal, and the sub-
sequent economic consequences of this not yet fully ex-
plained issue. 
Reference 2  
In cooperation with the responsible authorities, Volkswagen 
will do everything in its power to clarify the further course of 
action as quickly as possible and ensure the correct CO2 clas-
sification for the vehicles affected. 
2015_11_09_Press_Release_20 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
A series of talks between the Board of Management and the 
employee representative body will take place over the coming 
ten days in order to find a common path for the future of the 
company.  
Following today’s meeting, Müller said: “In the present dif-
ficult situation we must jointly make decisions that factor in 
economics just as much as employment. I attach great im-
portance to the views and experience of our works councils. 
In light of the changed circumstances, we are facing an am-
bitious task. We will be prioritizing forward-looking products 
and technologies. Bernd Osterloh and I agree that this is the 
key factor for reliably safeguarding both the future success of 
our company and employment.” 
Reference 2  
Osterloh commented: “Matthias Müller will personally take 
charge of cooperation between the Board of Management and 
the Works Council. That is a strong signal for the workforce. 
We will join him on the road to the future because we believe 
he is a reliable partner. We are seeking shared decisions in the 
interest of the company, shareholders and employees. The 
challenges are enormous, but the workforce will stand behind 
the company as long as we succeed in agreeing on a balanced 
package of investments, economy measures and forward-
looking projects. The discussions between Matthias Müller 
and myself have laid the foundation for that.” 
2015_11_13_Press_Release_21 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
In order to expedite any possible reassessment of the vehi-
cles’ CO2 figures without delay, the relevant authorities are 
being informed of the latest findings. At the same time the 
Volkswagen Group is informing its importers and trading 
partners. 
Reference 2  
The next step will now be, for example for the Volkswagen 
brand, for the new CO2 figures to be determined under the 
supervision of the German Federal Vehicle and Transport 
Authority (KBA). 
2015_11_25_Press_Release_22 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
Following an intensive examination, these measures have 
been ratified by the Federal Motor Transport Authority. 
Reference 2  
Based on these technical measures accepted by the Federal 
Motor Transport Authority, the necessary service concepts 
are currently being developed for the EU28 markets con-
cerned . 
2015_12_09_Press_Release_23 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
During internal remeasurements slight deviations were found 
on just nine model variants of the Volkswagen brand.  
These model variants will be remeasured by a neutral tech-
nical service under the supervision of the appropriate author-
ity by Christmas. 
2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 - 4 references coded  
Reference 1  
For the first time, the Company provided detailed commen-
tary on the status of its investigation, which is being coordi-
nated by a special committee of the Supervisory Board. Ap-
proximately 450 internal and external experts are involved in 
the investigations, which are being conducted in two phases. 
An internal review, being conducted by a task force of experts 
from various Group companies with a clearly defined man-
date and a deadline, is focused on the mandate to Group Audit 
by the Supervisory Board and the Management Board to in-
vestigate relevant processes, reporting and monitoring sys-
tems, and the associated infrastructure. Group Audit will pro-
vide its findings to the external experts of Jones Day. The Su-
pervisory Board has given this internationally respected law 
firm a parallel mandate to completely clarify the facts and re-
sponsibilities – i.e., among other things, it has been asked to 
conduct a forensic investigation. In connection with its work, 
Jones Day is being provided with operational support by the 
audit firm Deloitte. 
Reference 2  
Although Group Audit’s analysis of the processes will be 
concluded shortly, Jones Day will need well into next year in 
order to finish its work. The external investigators will need 
more time for their investigation, for two reasons. The first is 
that they have a massive volume of data to screen. At present, 
102 terabytes of information have been secured, which is the 
equivalent of the information contained in approximately 50 
million books. More than 1,500 electronic data storage units 
have been collected from approximately 380 employees. The 
second reason is that their investigation of the facts takes le-
gal responsibility into account. 
Reference 3  
Technical solutions, which have been positively evaluated by 
the German Federal Motor Transport Authority 
(“Kraftfahrtbundesamt”), are now available for the European 
variants of the EA 189 engine type affected. 
Reference 4  
To this end, Volkswagen is cooperating closely with the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the California Air Resources Board  
No. 437/2015  
Page 4  
(CARB). The solution designed for North America will be 
presented as soon as it has been approved by the responsible 
authorities. 
2015_12_16_Press_Release_25 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
The Volkswagen Group has presented the concrete measures 
proposed for the EA189 1.2, 1.6 and 2.0-litre engines to the 
Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA). After intensive 
review, the KBA has fully ratified all of the measures. The 
remedial measures for all affected vehicles are thus con-
firmed. 
 
 
 
INFORM CUSTOMERS 
2015_09_29_Press_Release_10 - 2 references coded 
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Reference 1 
In a first step, the customers affected will be informed that the 
emissions characteristics of their vehicles will be corrected in 
the near future. 
Reference 2 
Customers with these vehicles will be kept informed over the 
coming weeks and months. All of the Group brands affected 
will set up national websites to update customers on develop-
ments. 
 
 
2015_10_06_Press_Release_12 - 2 references coded 
Reference 1  
Nevertheless, he announced that a project team had drawn up 
an action plan. Over the coming days, the customers affected 
would be informed that the emissions characteristics of their 
vehicles would be upgraded. Furthermore, the company has 
set up websites where customers can check whether their ve-
hicles are affected by entering the chassis number. 
Reference 2  
Müller said: “In many instances a software update will be suf-
ficient. Some vehicles, however, will also require hardware 
modifications. We will keep our customers constantly in-
formed about the measures and arrange workshop appoint-
ments.” 
2015_10_15_Press_Release_15 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
Volkswagen will contact customers and inform them direct. 
In addition, every Volkswagen customer, for example, can 
visit the German website www.volkswagen.de/info set up on 
October 2, 2015 and enter the chassis number of their vehicle 
to find out straight away whether they are affected. Similar 
customer websites are active in the other EU countries and 
for the Audi, SEAT and ŠKODA brands. 
Reference 2  
Work on the technical solutions detailed in the plan of 
measures is currently proceeding at full speed. Remedial ac-
tion on the vehicles will begin in January 2016 – at no cost to 
our customers. The technical solutions can involve software 
as well as hardware measures. These are currently being de-
veloped for each affected series and each affected model year. 
2015_11_13_Press_Release_21 - 2 references coded 
Reference 1  
Over the coming week, the brands’ national customer infor-
mation pages on the Internet will also be added to with infor-
mation on the CO2 issue. By entering their vehicle identifi-
cation number (VIN), customers can find out here whether 
their vehicle is affected. For the Volkswagen brand in Ger-
many, for example, the link is www.volkswagen.de/info. 
Reference 2  
The Volkswagen Group is in addition already in dialogue 
with the respective countries’ financial and fiscal authorities 
so that all taxes arising in direct relation to the CO2 issue are 
charged straight to the Volkswagen Group and not to the cus-
tomers. 
2015_11_25_Press_Release_22 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
This means that correction measures have been fixed for the 
majority of the vehicles affected. In the development of the 
solutions, the focus was on maximum customer-friendliness. 
After implementation of the technical measures, the vehicles 
will comply with the applicable emissions standards. 
Reference 2  
Volkswagen will ensure that the time needed to implement 
the technical measures is as short as possible for all custom-
ers. In addition, Volkswagen will contact all customers and 
endeavour to consider individual customer needs during the 
implementation of these measures to avoid any disadvantages 
for the customer such as possible curbing of their mobility. In 
connection with this, the Volkswagen brand will thus ensure 
that all customers are offered appropriate replacement mobil-
ity options free of charge. 
Reference 3  
In addition, until 31 December 2016, Volkswagen AG is ex-
pressly forgoing the right to plea on the grounds of statutes of 
limitations in respect of any warranty or guarantee claims due 
to the software installed in vehicles with EA 189 engines, as 
long as the rights to make any such claims have not already 
expired. Volkswagen customers will therefore not be disad-
vantaged by any waiting. 
2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 - 3 references coded 
Reference 1  
Volkswagen will inform the owners of the affected vehicles 
individually as to when their vehicles will be updated. 
Volkswagen guarantees that the solutions will be imple-
mented free of charge. 
Reference 2  
The company waives any statute of limitations for the tech-
nical solutions, 
Reference 3 - 0.22 
and will provide an appropriate replacement vehicle if re-
quired. 
 
2015_12_16_Press_Release_25 - 4 references coded  
Reference 1  
In developing the technical measures, finding customer-
friendly solutions was an important aspect. 
Reference 2  
In a first letter the affected vehicle owners will be informed 
that a recall measure is scheduled for their car. The customers 
will also be asked to await further written information before 
they actively make contact with a Volkswagen partner busi-
ness. In a second letter Volkswagen will ask the affected cus-
tomers in good time to make an appointment with a partner 
business of their choice for implementation of the technical 
solutions. 
Reference 3  
While the technical measures are being performed 
Volkswagen AG aims to avoid any disadvantages for the cus-
tomers, such as any curbing of their mobility. In this connec-
tion the Volkswagen brand is assuring all customers that 
where necessary an appropriate replacement mobility option 
will be provided free of charge. 
Reference 4  
Until 31.12.2017 Volkswagen AG is expressly waiving the 
limitation period in respect of any claims made in connection 
with the software installed in vehicles with EA 189 engines. 
The waiving of this limitation applies even where a claim’s 
validity has already expired. The mere act of waiting will 
therefore not disadvantage Volkswagen customers in any 
way. This means that all customers affected can wait for the 
necessary technical measures to be implemented on their ve-
hicles by the above mentioned time. 
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EXCUSE 
2015_09_20_Press_Release_1 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1  
I personally am deeply sorry that we have broken the trust of 
our customers and the public 
2015_09_22_Press_Release_3 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1 
Millions of people all over the world trust our brands, our cars 
and our technologies. I am deeply sorry that we have broken 
this trust. I would like to make a formal apology to our cus-
tomers, to the authorities and to the general public for this 
misconduct. 
 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_7 - 2 references coded 
Reference 1 
There is absolutely no excuse for the manipulations which 
have deeply shocked Volkswagen. 
Reference 2 
We can only apologize and ask our customers, the public, the 
authorities and our investors to give us a chance to make 
amends. 
2015_10_06_Press_Release_12 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1 
He said that what had happened went against everything the 
Group and its people stand for and that there was no excuse. 
2015_11_03_Press_Release_19 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1  
“From the very start I have pushed hard for the relentless and 
comprehensive clarification of events. We will stop at noth-
ing and nobody. This is a painful process, but it is our only 
alternative. For us, the only thing that counts is the truth. That 
is the basis for the fundamental realignment that Volkswagen 
needs”, Matthias Müller, CEO of Volkswagen Aktiengesell-
schaft, said, and added. “The Board of Management of 
Volkswagen AG deeply regrets this situation and wishes to 
underscore its determination to systematically continue along 
the present path of clarification and transparency.” 
 
 
 
REPLACE PERSONNEL 
2015_09_23_Press_Release_4 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1 
As CEO I accept responsibility for the irregularities that have 
been found in diesel engines and have therefore requested the 
Supervisory Board to agree on terminating my function as 
CEO of the Volkswagen Group. 
Reference 2  
Volkswagen needs a fresh start – also in terms of personnel. 
I am clearing the way for this fresh start with my resignation. 
2015_09_23_Press_Release_5 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
3. The Executive Committee has great respect for Chairman 
Professor Dr. Winterkorn’s offer to resign his position and to 
ask that his employment agreement be terminated. The Exec-
utive Committee notes that Professor Dr. Winterkorn had no 
knowledge of the manipulation of emissions data. The Exec-
utive Committee has tremendous respect for his willingness 
to nevertheless assume responsibility and, in so doing, to send 
a strong signal both internally and externally. Dr. Winterkorn 
has made invaluable contributions to Volkswagen. The com-
pany’s rise to global company is inextricably linked to his 
name. The Executive Committee thanks Dr. Winterkorn for 
towering contributions in the past decades and for his will-
ingness to take responsibility in this criticall phase for the 
company. This attitude is illustrious. 
Reference 2  
4. Recommendations for new personnel will be presented at 
the upcoming meeting of the Supervisory Board this Friday. 
Reference 3  
The Executive Committee is expecting further personnel con-
sequences in the next days. The internal Group investigations 
are continuing at a high tempo. All participants in these pro-
ceedings that has resulted in unmeasurable harm for 
Volkswagen, will be subject to the full consequences. 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_7 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
3. With the information currently available the Supervisory 
Board recommended the immediate suspension of some em-
ployees. This process is already underway. 
Reference 2  
4. Matthias Müller will lead the Volkswagen Group going 
forward as the new CEO of Volkswagen AG. He is what the 
company needs now. Matthias Müller is exactly the right man 
at the right time to make a fresh start and to drive clarification 
of the current crisis that has hit our company with decisive-
ness and to draw the right conclusions. We expressly value 
his critical and constructive approach. 
Reference 3  
5. The Supervisory Board resolved to propose to the Extraor-
dinary Meeting of Shareholders on November 9, 2015 to elect 
Mr. Hans Dieter Pötsch as a member of the Supervisory 
Board. The Supervisory Board intends to subsequently elect 
him as its Chairman. 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_8 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
Matthias Müller (62) has been appointed CEO of 
Volkswagen AG with immediate effect. This was decided by 
the Supervisory Board at its meeting in Wolfsburg today (Fri-
day). 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_9 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
Effective November 1, the Group’s activities in the region 
will be led by Prof. Dr. Winfried Vahland (58), formerly 
Chairman of the Board of Directors at Škoda, who in this new 
role becomes a member of the Volkswagen brand Board of 
Management. Prof. Vahland’s successor as Chairman of the 
Board of Directors at Škoda will be Bernhard Maier (55), un-
til now Board Member for Sales and Marketing of Porsche 
AG. Michael Horn (52) remains President and CEO of 
Volkswagen Group of America. 
2015_10_01_Press_Release_11 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1  
As already decided by the Supervisory Board at the end of 
last week, Hans Dieter Pötsch is to become a Member of the 
Supervisory Board. Today (October 1, 2015), Julia Kuhn-
Piëch has  
No. 361/2015  
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stepped down from her position as a Member of the Supervi-
sory Board. “We would like to thank Mrs. Julia Kuhn-Piëch 
for her dedicated work in the Supervisory Board of 
Volkswagen AG and are pleased that she will continue to 
serve on other committees of the Group,” said the Deputy 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Berthold Huber. 
2015_10_07_Press_Release_13 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
At its meeting today, the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen 
Aktiengesellschaft elected Hans Dieter Pötsch (64) as its 
Chairman with immediate effect. The Supervisory Board ap-
pointed Frank Witter (56), previously Chairman of the Board 
of Management of Volkswagen Financial Services AG, to 
succeed Pötsch as Member of the Board of Management with 
responsibility for Finance and Controlling. 
2015_10_28_Press_Release_17 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
For this purpose, audit firm Deloitte has been engaged in ad-
dition to the steps already announced. According to Müller, 
those responsible for what has happened must face severe 
consequences. 
 
2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
Hans Dieter Pötsch stressed that, “No business transaction 
justifies overstepping legal and ethical bounds.” As a first 
step, nine managers who may have been involved in the ma-
nipulations were suspended. 
Reference 2  
At an organizational level, with the appointment of Dr. Chris-
tine Hohmann-Dennhardt, the Integrity & Law area will be 
represented as its own department on the Group’s Board of 
Management in the future – a clear indication that these issues 
are extremely important to Volkswagen. 
Reference 3  
The renewal of personnel in the Group has recently again 
been given new impetus. Since the beginning of 2015, the 
Group’s Board of Management has seen six new members 
join, seven of the brands have had their top personnel 
changed, and eight departments falling within the CEO’s area 
of responsibility now have new heads. Müller stated: "The 
team with which we wish to address the challenges of the 
coming months and years is in place.” 
 
 
 
REVISE PRACTICES 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_9 -2 references coded  
Reference 1 
According to Huber, “new, strong Group functions, such as 
for standardization and harmonized production processes, 
will lay the timely foundations for efficient decision-making. 
We will become faster and more agile.” 
Reference 2  
He said the developments of the last few days had under-
scored the urgency of this project: “We will not lose any time. 
The new management model will be implemented at the be-
ginning of 2016.” This would bring the Board greater free-
dom to address urgent issues concerning Group strategy, de-
velopment and steering. 
2015_10_13_Press_Release_14 -1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
Reorientation of the diesel strategy It was decided to switch 
over to installing only diesel drives with SCR and AdBlue 
technology in Europe and North America as soon as possible. 
Diesel vehicles will only be equipped with exhaust emissions 
systems that use the best environmental technology. 
2015_10_28_Press_Release_17 -1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
As his fourth priority, Müller is driving forward a realignment 
of the Group’s culture and management behavior. He noted 
that the pursuit of perfection, the employees’ commitment 
and social responsibility in the Volkswagen Group must be 
retained. However, he believes that changes are necessary in 
how Volkswagen communicates and how it handles its mis-
takes. “We need a culture of openness and cooperation.” Mül-
ler also called on everybody at Volkswagen to display more 
courage, greater creativity and a more entrepreneurial spirit 
in their dealings with one another. 
2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 -6 references coded  
Reference 1  
We are concentrating on structuring these processes more 
transparently and systematically. For example, in the future, 
software for engine control devices will be developed more 
strictly in accordance with the 4-eyes principle. In addition, 
the bodies responsible for the release of such software are be-
ing reorganized. 
Reference 2  
The main problem there was that responsibilities were not 
sufficiently clear. Volkswagen will now further sharpen 
them. 
Reference 3  
Group Audit also found deficiencies in some areas of 
Volkswagen’s IT infrastructure. These deficiencies will also 
be remedied. Volkswagen will introduce IT systems that al-
low individual processes to be monitored with greater effi-
ciency and transparency. This will simultaneously reduce our 
dependence on individuals when problematic processes have 
to be identified and, if necessary, escalated. 
Reference 4  
The Company has already drawn a key conclusion based on 
Group Audit’s findings, namely that its testing practice must 
undergo comprehensive changes. Volkswagen has decided 
that in the future emissions test will be evaluated externally 
and independently. In addition, randomly selected real-life 
tests to assess emissions behavior on the road will be intro-
duced. 
Reference 5  
Significantly more importance will be attached to digitaliza-
tion, which will report directly to the Chairman of the Board 
of Management. Overall, direct reports will be reduced from 
more than 30 to 19. 
Reference 6  
According to Müller, the future will be about more open dis-
cussions, closer cooperation, and a willingness to allow mis-
takes if they are understood as an opportunity to learn. The 
Chairman of the Board of Management stated, “We don’t 
need yes-men, but managers and engineers who make good 
arguments in support of their convictions and projects, who 
think and act like entrepreneurs. I am calling for people who 
are curious, independent, and pioneering. People who follow 
their instincts and are not merely guided by the possible con-
sequences of impending failure. In short: the future at 
Volkswagen belongs to the bold. We need a little more Sili-
con Valley, coupled with the competence from Wolfsburg, 
Ingolstadt, Stuttgart, and the other Group locations.” 
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RECONFIGURE 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_9 - 9 references coded  
Reference 1  
The Volkswagen Group is restructuring: Supervisory Board 
passes resolutions for new organization 
Reference 2  
The new structure strengthens the brands and regions, gives 
the Group Board of Management the necessary leeway for 
strategy and steering within the company, and lays a focus on 
the targeted development of future oriented fields.” 
Reference 3  
The Supervisory Board decided on the reorganization of the 
Group’s activities in North America. The markets in the USA, 
Mexico, and Canada will be combined and significantly 
strengthened to form a new North America region. 
Reference 4  
At Group level the management structure will be oriented 
even more systematically to the modular toolkits. These 
toolkits feature standardized technical components for each 
automotive vehicle segment (volume, premium, sport and 
commercial vehicles). Consequently, a Porsche brand group 
with Bentley and Bugatti will be established for the sportscar 
and mid-engine toolkit. The toolkit strategy will come under 
the even closer guidance of the Group CEO; a separate de-
partment will be set up for this purpose. 
Reference 5  
New Group functions for efficiency and future-oriented fields  
Group functions will concentrate more closely on efficiency 
and future-oriented fields; organizational units, for example 
for Group product strategy, new business fields, cooperations 
and holdings, connected car activities, and CO2 steering, will 
therefore be set up. 
Reference 6  
According to Huber, “new, strong Group functions, such as 
for standardization and harmonized production processes, 
will lay the timely foundations for efficient decision-making. 
We will become faster and more agile.” 
Reference 7  
At the same time, existing corporate bodies, structures and 
processes will be streamlined at Group level, in particular by 
strengthening the brands and regional accountability. To that 
end the Volkswagen brand will introduce a management 
structure with four regions, each led by a local CEO with a 
direct reporting line to the brand Chairman, Herbert Diess. 
Reference 8  
Streamlining the Group Board of Management  
The production department at Group level, until now led by 
Thomas Ulbrich in an interim capacity, will be abolished with 
immediate effect. This is one consequence of delegating re-
sponsibility to the brands and regions. Berthold Huber com-
mented: “Going forward, the brands and regions will also 
have greater independence with regard to production. So it 
follows that they should also hold the responsibility for these 
activities.” 
Reference 9  
The interim Supervisory Board Chairman emphasized that 
“one key point is that we are scaling back complexity in the 
Group. 
2015_10_06_Press_Release_12 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
He added that the company must now respond swiftly: “That 
is why we have initiated a further critical review of all 
planned investments. Anything that is not absolutely neces-
sary will be cancelled or postponed. 
Reference 2  
And it is why we will be intensifying the efficiency program. 
To be perfectly frank: this will not be a painless process.”  
Reference 3  
Müller added: “At the IAA we demonstrated that the 
Volkswagen Group is well positioned when it comes to the 
key technologies of the future. We cannot afford to jeopardize 
this strong position now. We must make massive savings to 
manage the consequences of this crisis. At the same time, 
though, we cannot afford to economize on the future. That is 
something else we will also be addressing over the coming 
weeks and months.” 
2015_10_13_Press_Release_14 - 4 references coded 
Reference 1  
Dr. Herbert Diess underscored: “The Volkswagen brand is re-
positioning itself for the future. We are becoming more effi-
cient, we are giving our product range and our core technolo-
gies a new focus, and we are creating room for forward-look-
ing technologies by speeding up the efficiency program.” 
Reference 2  
Systematic further development of the Modular Transverse 
Toolkit (MQB) There will be a major development thrust for 
the proven MQB standardized technical toolkit, where 
Volkswagen Passenger Cars holds responsibility for develop-
ment within the Group network. The focus is on plug-in hy-
brids with an even greater range, high-volume electric vehi-
cles with a radius of up to 300 kilometers, a 48-volt power 
supply system (mild hybrid) as well as ever more efficient 
diesel, petrol and CNG concepts. 
Reference 3  
MEB electric toolkit An MEB electric toolkit for future use 
in compact segment vehicles is to be developed based on the 
experience gained with existing vehicle architectures. This 
will be a multi-brand toolkit suitable for both passenger cars 
and light commercial vehicles and will thus leverage syner-
gies from other electric vehicle projects in the Group. The 
standardized system will be designed for all body structures 
and vehicle types, thus allowing particularly emotional vehi-
cle concepts, and will enable an all-electric range of 250 to 
500 kilometers. 
Reference 4  
Phaeton redefined – the future is electric The Volkswagen 
Phaeton has embodied the brand’s technological competence 
and brand ambition from the first generation onward. The fu-
ture generation of the Phaeton will once again be the flagship 
for the brand’s profile over the next decade. In light of this, 
the Board of Management redefined the current project. The 
specification features a pure electric drive with long-distance 
capability, connectivity and next generation assistance sys-
tems as well as an emotional design. 
2015_10_28_Press_Release_17 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
Müller’s third priority is to introduce new structures in the 
Volkswagen Group. “The key point is that Group manage-
ment will be decentralized to a greater extent in the future”, 
he said, with more independence for the brands and regions. 
Reference 2  
Müller stated that the Board of Management will focus on 
addressing cross-brand strategies, leveraging synergies and 
ensuring that Group resources are used effectively. “We will 
review in detail our current portfolio of more than 300 models 
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and examine the contribution that each one makes to our earn-
ings.” 
Reference 3  
The Volkswagen CEO announced that the fifth priority will 
be to transform the Group’s Strategy 2018 into a Strategy 
2025. “Many people outside of Volkswagen, but also some of 
us, did not understand that our Strategy 2018 is about much 
more than production numbers. A lot of things were subordi-
nated to the desire to be “Faster, Higher, Larger”, especially 
return on sales.” According to Müller, the point is not to sell 
100,000 more or fewer vehicles than a major competitor. In-
stead, the real issue is qualitative growth. Müller announced 
that the cornerstones of the Group’s Strategy 2025 will be de-
veloped over the coming months, and that it would be un-
veiled mid-way through next year. 
2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 - 6 references coded 
Reference 1  
Group Audit also found deficiencies in some areas of 
Volkswagen’s IT infrastructure. These deficiencies will also 
be remedied. Volkswagen will introduce IT systems that al-
low individual processes to be monitored with greater effi-
ciency and transparency. 
Reference 2  
As Pötsch stated: “Group Audit’s investigation is producing 
valuable findings, which will help us create a structure that, 
rather than favoring breaches of regulations, will prevent 
them, or at least allow them to be detected early on.” 
Reference 3  
Parallel to overcoming the crisis, Volkswagen is also institut-
ing a comprehensive new alignment that affects the structure 
of the Group, as well as its way of thinking and its strategic 
goals.  
Volkswagen will be managed in a more decentralized fashion 
in the future, and its brands and regions will be granted more 
independence. 
Reference 4  
Volkswagen will have significant input to the technical 
changes that have a major impact on its own business model, 
becoming more agile, and streamlining its decision-making 
processes 
Reference 5  
In addition, Volkswagen will become leaner and improve cost 
efficiency. All these structural changes ultimately aim to re-
duce managerial complexity and ensure that the Group can be 
effectively led over the long term. 
Reference 6  
In addition, Volkswagen has initiated development of a new 
strategic target: “Strategy 2025”, with which Volkswagen 
will address the main issues for the future, is scheduled to be 
presented in mid 2016. 
 
 
 
AFFIRMATION 
 
   2015_09_20_Press_Release_1 - 3 references coded  
 
   Reference 1  
 
We do not and will not tolerate violations of any kind of our 
internal rules or of the law. 
 
   Reference 2  
 
The trust of our customers and the public is and continues to 
be our most important asset. 
 
   Reference 3  
 
We at Volkswagen will do everything that must be done in 
order to re-establish the trust that so many people have placed 
in us, and we will do everything necessary in order to reverse 
the damage this has caused. This matter has first priority for 
me, personally, and for our entire Board of Management. 
 
   2015_09_22_Press_Release_2 - 4 references coded 
 
   Reference 1  
 
Volkswagen is working at full speed to clarify irregularities 
concerning a particular software used in diesel engines. 
 
   Reference 2  
 
Volkswagen is working intensely to eliminate these devia-
tions through technical measures. 
 
   Reference 3  
 
To cover the necessary service measures and other efforts to 
win back the trust of our customers, Volkswagen plans to set 
aside a provision of some 6.5 billion EUR recognized in the 
profit and loss statement in the third quarter of the current 
fiscal year. 
 
   Reference 4  
 
It is and remains the top priority of the Board of Management 
to win back lost trust and to avert damage to our customers. 
The Group will inform the public on the further progress of 
the investigations constantly and transparently. 
 
   2015_09_22_Press_Release_3 - 4 references coded 
 
   Reference 1  
 
"The irregularities that have been found in our Group’s diesel 
engines go against everything Volkswagen stands for. 
 
   Reference 2   
 
We owe that to our customers, our employees and the public. 
Manipulation and Volkswagen – that must never be allowed 
to happen again. 
 
   Reference 3  
 
We will do everything necessary to reverse the damage. And 
we will do everything necessary to win back trust – step by 
step. 
 
   Reference 4  
 
That is why we are asking for trust as we move forward: We 
will get to the bottom of this. We are working very hard on 
the necessary technical solutions. And we will do everything 
we can to avert damage to our customers and employees. I 
give you my word: we will do all of this with the greatest 
possible openness and transparency." 
 
   2015_09_23_Press_Release_4 - 1 reference coded 
 
   Reference 1  
 
Wolfsburg, 23. September 2015 – “I am shocked by the 
events of the past few days. Above all, I am stunned that mis-
conduct on such a scale was possible in the Volkswagen 
Group. 
 
   2015_09_23_Press_Release_5 - 4 references coded 
 
   Reference 1  
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1. The Executive Committee takes this matter extremely se-
riously. The Executive Committee recognizes not only the 
economic damage caused, but also the loss of trust among 
many customers worldwide. 
 
   Reference 2  
 
The Executive Committee agrees that these incidents need to 
be clarified with great conviction and that mistakes are cor-
rected. At the same time, the Executive Committee is ada-
mant that it will take the necessary decisive steps to ensure a 
credible new beginning. 
 
   Reference 3  
 
8. The Executive Committee is aware that coming to terms 
with the crisis of trust will be a long term task that requires a 
high degree of consistency and thoroughness. 
 
   Reference 4  
 
We consider it our task that this company regains the trust of 
our customers in every respect. 
 
   2015_09_25_Press_Release_6 - 3 references coded 
 
   Reference 1  
 
Dr. Herbert Diess, CEO of the Volkswagen Passenger Cars 
brand, explains: “We are working at full speed on a solution.”  
 
   Reference 2  
 
We are working at full speed on a technical solution that we 
will present to partners, to our customers and to the public as 
swiftly as possible. 
 
   Reference 3  
 
Our aim is to inform our customers as quickly as possible, so 
that their vehicles comply fully with regulations. I assure you 
that Volkswagen will do everything humanly possible to win 
back the trust of our customers, the dealerships and the pub-
lic.” 
 
   
   2015_09_25_Press_Release_7 - 1 reference coded  
    
   Reference 1  
 
The company will leave no stone unturned in getting to the 
bottom of this, will call those responsible to account, and take 
the necessary actions. 
 
   2015_09_25_Press_Release_8 - 2 references coded  
 
   Reference 1  
 
Matthias Müller said: “My most urgent task is to win back 
trust for the Volkswagen Group – by leaving no stone un-
turned and with maximum transparency, as well as drawing 
the right conclusions from the current situation. 
 
   Reference 2  
 
Under my leadership, Volkswagen will do everything it can 
to develop and implement the most stringent compliance and 
governance standards in our industry. If we manage to 
achieve that then the Volkswagen Group with its innovative 
strength, its strong brands and above all its competent and 
highly motivated team has the opportunity to emerge from 
this crisis stronger than before.” 
 
   2015_10_06_Press_Release_12 - 9 references coded  
 
   Reference 1  
 
Matthias Müller: “We will overcome this crisis” 
 
   Reference 2  
 
Speaking at a works meeting in Wolfsburg today the CEO of 
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Matthias Müller, promised 
employees “swift and relentless clarification” of the emis-
sions scandal. 
 
   Reference 3  
 
At the same time he encouraged employees to take heart: “We 
can and we will overcome this crisis, because Volkswagen is 
a group with a strong foundation. And above all because we 
have the best automobile team anyone could wish for.” 
 
   Reference 4  
 
He added that the company would do everything it could to 
ensure that Volkswagen continues to stand for good and se-
cure jobs in the future. 
 
   Reference 5  
 
Speaking to more than 20,000 employees in Hall 11 at the 
Wolfsburg plant, Müller made it clear that “apart from the 
enormous financial damage which it is still not possible to 
quantify as of today, this crisis is first and foremost a crisis of 
confidence. That is because it is about the very core of our 
company and our identity: it is about our vehicles.” Müller 
went on to say that solidity, reliability and credibility belong 
to the essence of the Volkswagen brand: “Our most important 
task will therefore be to win back the trust we have lost – with 
our customers, partners, investors and the general public.” 
According to Müller, the first step toward achieving that was 
swift and relentless clarification. “Only when everything has 
been put on the table, when no single stone has been left un-
turned, only then will people begin to trust us again,” Müller 
said. 
 
   Reference 6  
 
For Wolfsburg, that means production can continue.” 
 
   Reference 7  
 
And it is why we will be intensifying the efficiency program. 
To be perfectly frank: this will not be a painless process.” 
However, he also gave employees reassurance: “We will do 
everything we can to ensure that Volkswagen continues to 
stand for good and secure jobs in the future.” 
 
   Reference 8  
 
One conclusion, however, was already clear: “Volkswagen 
must once again stand for more integrity. Not just on paper. 
But anytime, anywhere. We will make every effort to make 
very sure that the rules are respected by everyone. This Group 
and its brands stand for sustainability, for responsibility, for 
credibility. 
 
   Reference 9  
 
together with you, I am determined to prove that our values 
remain our guide. And that Volkswagen, that each one of us, 
deserves the trust of people everywhere.” 
 
   2015_10_07_Press_Release_13 - 1 reference coded  
 
   Reference 1  
 
Speaking after the meeting, Pötsch said: “I am grateful to the 
Supervisory Board for the trust expressed by my election as 
Chairman. I will do my utmost to uncover the full truth of 
what happened. I am firmly resolved to make my contribution 
so that Volkswagen can win back the trust of customers, the 
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public, investors and business partners. And I believe my cen-
tral task is to play my part in guiding Volkswagen towards a 
successful future.” 
 
   2015_10_13_Press_Release_14 - 1 reference coded  
 
   Reference 1  
 
Diess continued: “Together with my Board of Management 
colleagues and the entire team we are working at top speed 
on these issues. Time and again, the Volkswagen team has 
proved it stands united and is fully focused on shaping the 
future, particularly when times are tough. We have now laid 
the further foundations for that.” 
 
   2015_10_28_Press_Release_17 - 3 references coded  
 
   Reference 1  
 
Müller is confident that “Volkswagen will emerge from the 
current situation stronger than before”. 
    
   Reference 2  
 
The Volkswagen CEO explained that his top priority is to 
support the customers affected by the diesel issue. “Our cus-
tomers are at the core of everything that our 600,000 employ-
ees worldwide do”, he said. 
 
   Reference 3  
 
Müller’s second priority is to systematically drive forward 
and complete the investigation into what happened. “We must 
uncover the truth and learn from it”, he said, adding that 
Volkswagen is being extremely thorough in its analysis. 
 
    
   2015_11_09_Press_Release_20 - 1 reference coded  
 
   Reference 1 
 
A series of talks between the Board of Management and the 
employee representative body will take place over the coming 
ten days in order to find a common path for the future of the 
company.  
Following today’s meeting, Müller said: “In the present dif-
ficult situation we must jointly make decisions that factor in 
economics just as much as employment. I attach great im-
portance to the views and experience of our works councils. 
In light of the changed circumstances, we are facing an am-
bitious task. We will be prioritizing forward-looking products 
and technologies. Bernd Osterloh and I agree that this is the 
key factor for reliably safeguarding both the future success of 
our company and employment.” 
 
   2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 - 6 references coded  
 
   Reference 1  
 
The Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen AG, 
Hans Dieter Pötsch, told the press in Wolfsburg today: “The 
Volkswagen Group is fully functional in every respect, even 
during these eventful days. How, and when we meet the cur-
rent challenges is primarily – although not solely – up to us. 
In order to pass this test, we must make an enormous, com-
mon effort – and we are all ready to do so.” The Chairman of 
the Board of Management, Matthias Müller, said: “We are 
doing everything to overcome the current situation, but we 
will not allow the crisis to paralyze us. On the contrary, we 
will use it as a catalyst to make the changes Volkswagen 
needs.” 
 
   Reference 2  
 
The Company has already drawn a key conclusion based on 
Group Audit’s findings, namely that its testing practice must 
undergo comprehensive changes. Volkswagen has decided 
that in the future emissions test will be evaluated externally 
and independently. In addition, randomly selected real-life 
tests to assess emissions behavior on the road will be intro-
duced. Chairman of the Supervisory Board Pötsch stated: 
“We hope that this will help Volkswagen regain lost trust.” 
 
   Reference 3  
 
Pötsch emphasized: “I here and now guarantee that we will 
pursue our thorough investigation to its conclusion. I vouch 
for this personally, as does the entire Supervisory Board of 
Volkswagen AG.” 
    
   Reference 4  
 
Matthias Müller, Chairman of the Board of Management, 
promised: "Volkswagen will not rest until this matter has 
been resolved once and for all to our customers’ satisfaction.” 
 
   Reference 5  
 
Müller explained, “We are realigning Volkswagen strategi-
cally and technologically. Our goal is to courageously and de-
cisively participate in shaping the future of mobility.” Among 
other things, the Group aims to achieve a significant expan-
sion of its sales outside of its current core business. Further-
more, a digitalization and an electrification offensive are be-
ing prepared. 
 
   Reference 6  
 
In summary, the Chairman of the Board of Management 
stated: “Although the current situation is serious, this com-
pany will not be broken by it. We have a clear mission: we 
will create a new, better, and stronger Volkswagen. A com-
pany that uses its strengths to make the transition to the new 
world of automobiles. A company that now releases new 
forces, and takes better advantage of its huge potential. And, 
last but not least, a company that will be successful over the 
long term on the basis of strong values.” 
 
 
 
EXPLAIN 
2015_09_22_Press_Release_2 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1 
Discrepancies relate to vehicles with Type EA 189 engines, 
involving some eleven million vehicles worldwide. A notice-
able deviation between bench test results and actual road use 
was established solely for this type of engine. 
2015_09_22_Press_Release_3 - 1 reference coded  
At present we do not yet have all the answers to all the ques-
tions. But we are working hard to find out exactly what hap-
pened. To do that, we are putting everything on the table, as 
quickly, thoroughly and transparently as possible. 
2015_09_25_Press_Release_6 - 3 references coded 
Reference 1 
Wolfsburg, September 25, 2015 – In the press release dated 
September 22, 2015, the Volkswagen Group announced that 
Volkswagen Group vehicles worldwide are affected by the 
current issues regarding emissions.  
The internal evaluation revealed that approximately five mil-
lion Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand vehicles are affected 
worldwide. 
Reference 2 
Certain models and model years of these vehicles (such as the 
sixth generation Volkswagen Golf, the seventh generation 
Volkswagen Passat and the first generation Volkswagen Ti-
guan) are equipped exclusively with type EA 189 diesel en-
gines. 
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Reference 3  
The Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand will inform all mar-
kets worldwide how many of vehicles are affected locally. 
2015_09_29_Press_Release_10 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
An internal evaluation on Friday established that a service 
procedure is required for some five million vehicles from the 
Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand out of a total eleven mil-
lion Group vehicles worldwide. 
2015_10_01_Press_Release_11 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
In seven hours of intense discussions the Executive Commit-
tee of the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen AG yesterday 
(September 30) discussed the current status with respect to 
the manipulation of diesel engine exhaust emissions. 
Reference 2 
The Executive Committee came to the conclusion that the 
completion of investigations will take at least several months. 
2015_10_06_Press_Release_12 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1  
Müller pointed out that not all the facts were on the table yet. 
2015_10_15_Press_Release_15 - 1 reference coded  
Reference 1  
The Volkswagen Group will recall a total of approximately 
8.5 million vehicles in Europe (EU28 markets), including 
some 2.4 million vehicles in Germany, according to KBA. 
Outside the EU28, each individual country will clarify in de-
tail which emissions classes of the EA 189 engine are in fact 
affected. 
2015_11_03_Press_Release_19 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
The Volkswagen Group is moving forward with the clarifica-
tion of the diesel issue: during the course of internal investi-
gations irregularities were found when determining type ap-
proval CO2 levels. Based on present knowledge around 
800,000 vehicles from the Volkswagen Group could be af-
fected. An initial estimate puts the economic risks at approx-
imately two billion euros. 
Reference 2  
Under the ongoing review of all processes and workflows in 
connection with diesel engines it was established that the 
CO2 levels and thus the fuel consumption figures for some 
models were set too low during the CO2 certification process. 
The majority of the vehicles concerned have diesel engines. 
Reference 3 
reliable assessment of the scale of these irregularities is not 
yet possible. An initial estimate puts the economic risks at 
approximately two billion euros. 
2015_11_13_Press_Release_21 - 1 reference coded 
Reference 1  
To what extent models of previous years are affected contin-
ues to be looked into in conjunction with the authorities. 
Based on what is known at present, the Volkswagen Group 
continues to anticipate that this will be the previously com-
municated total figure of around 800,000 vehicles.  
2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 - 3 references coded  
Reference 1  
Now, the first significant findings in the investigation of the 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) issue are available. Group Audit’s ex-
amination of the relevant processes indicates that the soft-
ware-influenced NOx emissions behavior was due to the in-
teraction of three factors:  
• The misconduct and shortcomings of individual employees 
• Weaknesses in some processes • A mindset in some areas of 
the Company that tolerated breaches of rules. 
Reference 2  
It is clear that, in the past, deficiencies in processes have fa-
vored misconduct on the part of individuals. This is true, for 
example, for test and certification processes affecting our en-
gine control devices, which were not suited to preventing use 
of the software in question. 
Reference 3  
The information that has been screened to date has largely 
explained the origin and development of the nitrogen oxide 
issue. It proves not to have been a one-time error, but rather a 
chain of errors that were allowed to happen. The starting point 
was a strategic decision to launch a large-scale promotion of 
diesel vehicles in the United States in 2005. Initially, it 
proved impossible to have the EA 189 engine meet by legal 
means the stricter nitrogen oxide requirements in the United 
States within the required timeframe and budget. This led to 
the incorporation of software that adjusted nitrogen oxide 
emission levels according to whether vehicles were on the 
road or being tested. Later, when an effective technical pro-
cess was available to reduce NOx emissions, it was not em-
ployed to the full extent possible. On the contrary, the soft-
ware in question allowed the exhaust gas treatment additive 
“AdBlue” to be injected in variable amounts such that the 
NOx values were particularly low when vehicles were in the 
test bay, but significantly higher when vehicles were on the 
road. 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
2015_11_25_Press_Release_22 - 7 references coded 
Reference 1  
Wolfsburg, November 25, 2015 – The clarification and solu-
tion of the diesel issue is progressing. The Volkswagen Group 
has presented specific technical measures for the EA 189 en-
gines affected with a displacement of 1.6 and 2.0 litres to the 
Federal Motor Transport Authority. This means that correc-
tion measures have been fixed for the majority of the vehicles 
affected. 
Reference 2  
The final technical solution for the 1.2-litre diesel engine will 
be presented to the Federal Motor Transport Authority at the 
end of the month and is expected to comprise a software up-
date. 
Reference 3  
A “flow transformer” will be fitted directly in front of the air 
mass sensor on the 1.6-litre EA 189 engine. This is a mesh 
that calms the swirled air flow in front of the air mass sensor 
and will thus decisively improve the measuring accuracy of 
the air mass sensor. The air mass sensor determines the cur-
rent air mass throughput, which is a very important parameter 
for the engine management for an optimum combustion pro-
cess. In addition, a software update will be performed on this 
engine. The time needed for the implementation of the tech-
nical measures is expected to be less than one hour. 
Reference 4  
The 2.0 litre engines will get a software update. The pure la-
bour time for this measure will be around half an hour. 
Reference 5 
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The objective for the development of the technical measures 
is still to achieve the applicable emission targets in each case 
without any adverse effects on the engine output, fuel con-
sumption and performance. 
Reference 6  
According to the current assessment, all measures in the 
course of the recall for all engine variants will extend over the 
whole calendar year 2016. 
Reference 7  
Based on the approach of the Volkswagen brand, the Group’s 
other brands – Audi, SEAT, ŠKODA and Volkswagen Com-
mercial Vehicles – are also planning corresponding measures 
for their affected vehicles. 
2015_12_10_Press_Release_24 - 4 references coded  
Reference 1  
Technical solutions, which have been positively evaluated by 
the German Federal Motor Transport Authority 
(“Kraftfahrtbundesamt”), are now available for the European 
variants of the EA 189 engine type affected. Volkswagen is 
thus ensuring that the models affected in Europe will meet all 
legal requirements in the future. The costs of implementing 
these solutions will be manageable in technical, manufactur-
ing, and financial terms. The software of the 2.0 and 1.2 liter 
TDI will be updated. For the 1.6 liter TDI, a so-called flow 
transformer will be used that increases the measurement pre-
cision and, in combination with redesigned software, will op-
timize injection quantity. 
Reference 2 
Now that the technical solutions have been approved, 
Volkswagen is working intensely on plans to implement 
them. The recall of the highest-volume variant, the 2.0 liter 
TDI, will begin in January 2016. 
Reference 3  
The recall of the 1.2 liter TDI is currently scheduled to begin 
in the second quarter. The implementation phase for the 1.6 
liter models is planned to begin in the third quarter to allow 
time to prepare for the hardware modification. Under the cur-
rent plan, the entire initiative will take at least all of calendar 
year 2016. 
Reference 4  
Due to far stricter nitrogen oxide limits in the United States, 
it is a greater technical challenge to retrofit the vehicles such 
that all applicable emissions limits can be met with one and 
the same emissions strategy. 
2015_12_16_Press_Release_25 - 2 references coded  
Reference 1  
The Volkswagen Group has presented the concrete measures 
proposed for the EA189 1.2, 1.6 and 2.0-litre engines to the 
Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA). After intensive 
review, the KBA has fully ratified all of the measures. The 
remedial measures for all affected vehicles are thus con-
firmed. 
Reference 2  
The measures for the affected EA189 diesel engines are as 
follows:  
- The 1.2-litre and 2.0-litre engines will get a software update. 
The pure labour time will be just under half an hour.  
- The 1.6-litre engines will also get a software update. In ad-
dition, a “flow rectifier” will be fitted right in front of the air 
mass sensor. The labour time for implementing these 
measures will be less than an hour. 
 
 
 
